From: Joe Konno <joe.konno@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com,
jk@ozlabs.org, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 10:22:07 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180215182208.35003-2-joe.konno@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180215182208.35003-1-joe.konno@linux.intel.com>
From: Joe Konno <joe.konno@intel.com>
Efivarfs nodes are created with group and world readable permissions.
Reading certain EFI variables trigger SMIs. So, this is a potential DoS
surface.
Make permissions more restrictive-- only the owner may read or write to
created inodes.
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Cc: Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joe Konno <joe.konno@intel.com>
---
fs/efivarfs/super.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/super.c b/fs/efivarfs/super.c
index 5b68e4294faa..ca98c4e31eb7 100644
--- a/fs/efivarfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/efivarfs/super.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int efivarfs_callback(efi_char16_t *name16, efi_guid_t vendor,
name[len + EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN+1] = '\0';
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, d_inode(root), S_IFREG | 0644, 0,
+ inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, d_inode(root), S_IFREG | 0600, 0,
is_removable);
if (!inode)
goto fail_name;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
sb->s_d_op = &efivarfs_d_ops;
sb->s_time_gran = 1;
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0, true);
+ inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | 0700, 0, true);
if (!inode)
return -ENOMEM;
inode->i_op = &efivarfs_dir_inode_operations;
--
2.14.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-15 18:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-15 18:22 [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Joe Konno
2018-02-15 18:22 ` Joe Konno [this message]
2018-02-20 19:18 ` [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-20 21:18 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 21:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 21:32 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 21:35 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 22:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-20 23:30 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 23:39 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 23:50 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 0:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 1:05 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 2:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 9:03 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-21 18:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 18:21 ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-21 19:47 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 19:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 19:58 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 20:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 1:45 ` [PATCH] efivarfs: Limit the rate for non-root to read files Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 1:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 5:34 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 17:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CA+55aFy0hRexJkLbN7t31LjfGr4Ae0W5g6sBMqHHJi8aYuGKeA@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <612E894E-62C8-4155-AED8-D53702EDC8DC@intel.com>
[not found] ` <CA+55aFxeBaTbwvbWqx1MKYjKKzLUs=1O43Bx2=JaO8qrnY-8HA@mail.gmail.com>
2018-02-22 17:15 ` [PATCH v2] " Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 17:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 17:54 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 18:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 18:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-23 20:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-23 19:47 ` [PATCH] " Peter Jones
2018-02-21 19:52 ` [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions Linus Torvalds
2018-02-24 20:06 ` Alan Cox
2018-02-25 10:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-21 0:49 ` Peter Jones
2018-02-20 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-15 18:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] efi: restrict top-level attribute permissions Joe Konno
2018-02-16 10:41 ` [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 10:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 10:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 11:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 11:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 18:48 ` Joe Konno
2018-02-16 18:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 19:22 ` Peter Jones
2018-02-16 19:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 19:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 19:32 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 19:54 ` Peter Jones
2018-02-16 20:51 ` James Bottomley
2018-02-16 21:09 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 21:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16 21:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 22:02 ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 22:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-17 18:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16 22:05 ` Peter Jones
2018-02-17 9:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-17 16:17 ` Andi Kleen
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