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From: Joe Konno <joe.konno@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com,
	jk@ozlabs.org, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 10:22:07 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180215182208.35003-2-joe.konno@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180215182208.35003-1-joe.konno@linux.intel.com>

From: Joe Konno <joe.konno@intel.com>

Efivarfs nodes are created with group and world readable permissions.
Reading certain EFI variables trigger SMIs. So, this is a potential DoS
surface.

Make permissions more restrictive-- only the owner may read or write to
created inodes.

Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Cc: Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joe Konno <joe.konno@intel.com>
---
 fs/efivarfs/super.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/super.c b/fs/efivarfs/super.c
index 5b68e4294faa..ca98c4e31eb7 100644
--- a/fs/efivarfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/efivarfs/super.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int efivarfs_callback(efi_char16_t *name16, efi_guid_t vendor,
 
 	name[len + EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN+1] = '\0';
 
-	inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, d_inode(root), S_IFREG | 0644, 0,
+	inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, d_inode(root), S_IFREG | 0600, 0,
 				   is_removable);
 	if (!inode)
 		goto fail_name;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	sb->s_d_op		= &efivarfs_d_ops;
 	sb->s_time_gran         = 1;
 
-	inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0, true);
+	inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | 0700, 0, true);
 	if (!inode)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	inode->i_op = &efivarfs_dir_inode_operations;
-- 
2.14.1

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-15 18:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-15 18:22 [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Joe Konno
2018-02-15 18:22 ` Joe Konno [this message]
2018-02-20 19:18   ` [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-20 21:18     ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 21:22       ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 21:32         ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 21:35           ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 22:01       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-20 23:30         ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-20 23:39           ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-20 23:50             ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21  0:49           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21  1:05             ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21  2:16               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21  9:03                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-21 18:02                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 18:21                     ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-21 19:47                       ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 19:50                         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-21 19:58                           ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-21 20:40                             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22  1:45                               ` [PATCH] efivarfs: Limit the rate for non-root to read files Luck, Tony
2018-02-22  1:58                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22  5:34                                   ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 17:10                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
     [not found]                                     ` <CA+55aFy0hRexJkLbN7t31LjfGr4Ae0W5g6sBMqHHJi8aYuGKeA@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]                                       ` <612E894E-62C8-4155-AED8-D53702EDC8DC@intel.com>
     [not found]                                         ` <CA+55aFxeBaTbwvbWqx1MKYjKKzLUs=1O43Bx2=JaO8qrnY-8HA@mail.gmail.com>
2018-02-22 17:15                                           ` [PATCH v2] " Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 17:39                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 17:54                                               ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-22 18:07                                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-22 18:08                                                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-23 20:34                                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-23 19:47                                         ` [PATCH] " Peter Jones
2018-02-21 19:52                       ` [PATCH 1/2] fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions Linus Torvalds
2018-02-24 20:06                   ` Alan Cox
2018-02-25 10:56                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-21  0:49         ` Peter Jones
2018-02-20 23:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-15 18:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] efi: restrict top-level attribute permissions Joe Konno
2018-02-16 10:41 ` [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 10:58     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 11:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 11:18         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 18:48           ` Joe Konno
2018-02-16 18:58             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-16 19:22             ` Peter Jones
2018-02-16 19:31               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-16 19:51                 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 19:32               ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 19:54                 ` Peter Jones
2018-02-16 20:51   ` James Bottomley
2018-02-16 21:09     ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 21:45       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16 21:58         ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-16 22:02           ` Luck, Tony
2018-02-16 22:03             ` Matthew Garrett
2018-02-17 18:12               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-16 22:05       ` Peter Jones
2018-02-17  9:36         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-17 16:17           ` Andi Kleen

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