From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x227UPlt46QaiiE/2957cUVQyIAcAqIVMijCBHv734DwSxzyX5v75HPXrShUnhtLehK/JRxMl ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1519175631; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=B0iFDQJYalj/wLvgV8Sej1hXBy30/ZukmC/WGWklZXBElaOSN3c7sRc2cnCT0OZF9l 6ZNnPIHj8QYYqOOHYn01gVxxnyljlmQl49x2KNZdSU7M7Wg842uJzHpSVOqWRwMRsQ6p zvLuy8xNVHbuY0fTtW/pCTbtSC7aB711Fo2iyzDbd0jgkSkPmWYMnmK4liBWWwS4BPLs 2gW8KiLzJP+VkY5ysoNio7JisPhBrqQvoAA0bNMsoiTfrxTewsMf7yuXSpiHKLeJWdMG 9hfS2C3Qh2GXxlzyYdXz543mep99lAJefUW09IV67Lfg3YNRsuAGOABAKNE01vC83erC 9PoQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from :delivered-to:list-id:list-subscribe:list-unsubscribe:list-help :list-post:precedence:mailing-list:arc-authentication-results; bh=lVX409BQ8EYHSIz7eCEkfJMjQYGkylcLquYnJBNCYCc=; b=aWCFeYecFo9+F0m8i6s6ludgqqGojle3SrcHh4ewvMv9CzHQLDNxwvklofmBa2JEv8 qVd3MpwQpPAus8GxUxiO+XM0mPBk28N2M+uzj0K6XBGrI2Ph3ZK2TaWY332KX8gDgYek c3mO/W8xTCBUnkR3j4i47u9khRRIW2vO5chRaUKQlmHI/YvHCSnUz2W+0BVEM0eGtqoE yNATsbRCwNXWW9dJoX6xPolYC/iadEpZwoizexLBul2VkgrWQkskyHVLUTsj65NiK1ud Eammz2zrUyrrr3znZNPivHh9p59Lg+rk1eylkjxTCw4UNCk/Cy9kY9b2WyHOws/Bp8se 8sVA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of kernel-hardening-return-11843-gregkh=linuxfoundation.org@lists.openwall.com designates 195.42.179.200 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-11843-gregkh=linuxfoundation.org@lists.openwall.com; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of kernel-hardening-return-11843-gregkh=linuxfoundation.org@lists.openwall.com designates 195.42.179.200 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-11843-gregkh=linuxfoundation.org@lists.openwall.com; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: From: Laura Abbott To: Alexander Popov , Kees Cook , Mark Rutland , Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Laura Abbott , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 17:13:03 -0800 Message-Id: <20180221011303.20392-3-labbott@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.3 In-Reply-To: <20180221011303.20392-1-labbott@redhat.com> References: <20180221011303.20392-1-labbott@redhat.com> X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1592971106986303834?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1592971106986303834?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 6 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 16 +++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +- scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 5 +- 7 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 7381eeb7ef8e..dcadcae674a7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER + select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index fce604e3e599..4b309101ac83 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */ unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */ struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + unsigned long lowest_stack; +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS + unsigned long prev_lowest_stack; +#endif +#endif }; /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c index 1303e04110cd..b5c6100e8b14 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(TSK_TI_TTBR0, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread_info.ttbr0)); #endif DEFINE(TSK_STACK, offsetof(struct task_struct, stack)); +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + DEFINE(TSK_TI_LOWEST_STACK, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.lowest_stack)); +#endif BLANK(); DEFINE(THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.cpu_context)); BLANK(); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index ec2ee720e33e..b909b436293a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info .text + .macro erase_kstack +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + bl __erase_kstack +#endif + .endm /* * Exception vectors. */ @@ -901,6 +906,7 @@ work_pending: */ ret_to_user: disable_daif + erase_kstack ldr x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] and x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK cbnz x2, work_pending @@ -1337,3 +1343,105 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_handler) NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_handler) #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */ + +/* + * This is what the stack looks like + * + * +---+ <- task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE + * | | + * +---+ <- task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_START_SP + * | | + * | | + * +---+ <- task_pt_regs(p) + * | | + * | | + * | | <- current_sp + * ~~~~~ + * + * ~~~~~ + * | | <- lowest_stack + * | | + * | | + * +---+ <- task_stack_page(p) + * + * This function is desgned to poison the memory between the lowest_stack + * and the current stack pointer. After clearing the stack, the lowest + * stack is reset. + */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +ENTRY(__erase_kstack) + mov x10, x0 // save x0 for the fast path + + get_thread_info x0 + ldr x1, [x0, #TSK_TI_LOWEST_STACK] + + /* get the number of bytes to check for lowest stack */ + mov x3, x1 + and x3, x3, #THREAD_SIZE - 1 + lsr x3, x3, #3 + + /* generate addresses from the bottom of the stack */ + mov x4, sp + movn x2, #THREAD_SIZE - 1 + and x1, x4, x2 + + mov x2, #STACKLEAK_POISON + + mov x5, #0 +1: + /* + * As borrowed from the x86 logic, start from the lowest_stack + * and go to the bottom to find the poison value. + * The check of 16 is to hopefully avoid false positives. + */ + cbz x3, 4f + ldr x4, [x1, x3, lsl #3] + cmp x4, x2 + csinc x5, xzr, x5, ne + tbnz x5, #STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH/4, 4f // found 16 poisons? + sub x3, x3, #1 + b 1b + +4: + /* total number of bytes to poison */ + add x5, x1, x3, lsl #3 + mov x4, sp + sub x8, x4, x5 + + cmp x8, #THREAD_SIZE // sanity check the range + b.lo 5f + ASM_BUG() + +5: + /* + * We may have hit a path where the stack did not get used, + * no need to do anything here + */ + cbz x8, 7f + + sub x8, x8, #1 // don't poison the current stack pointer + + lsr x8, x8, #3 + add x3, x3, x8 + + /* + * The logic of this loop ensures the last stack word isn't + * ovewritten. + */ +6: + cbz x8, 7f + str x2, [x1, x3, lsl #3] + sub x3, x3, #1 + sub x8, x8, #1 + b 6b + + /* Reset the lowest stack to the top of the stack */ +7: + mov x1, sp + str x1, [x0, #TSK_TI_LOWEST_STACK] + + mov x0, x10 + ret +ENDPROC(__erase_kstack) +#endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index ad8aeb098b31..fd0528db6772 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -357,6 +357,9 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start, p->thread.cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork; p->thread.cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs; +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p); +#endif ptrace_hw_copy_thread(p); return 0; @@ -486,3 +489,16 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) { current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long sp, stack_left; + + sp = current_stack_pointer; + + stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1); + BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca); +#endif diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index 7b3ba40f0745..35ebbc1b17ff 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ -D__NO_FORTIFY \ $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \ - $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) + $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \ + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) GCOV_PROFILE := n KASAN_SANITIZE := n diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins index 8d6070fc538f..6cc0e35d3324 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins +++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins @@ -37,11 +37,14 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak_plugin.so gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE) + ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable + endif GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y)) export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR - export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN + export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN ifneq ($(PLUGINCC),) # SANCOV_PLUGIN can be only in CFLAGS_KCOV because avoid duplication. -- 2.14.3