From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:40:45 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180314214045.GC14289@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180314202020.3794-4-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Quoting Thiago Jung Bauermann (bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>
> Replace nested ifs in the EVM xattr verification logic with a switch
> statement, making the code easier to understand.
>
> Also, add comments to the if statements in the out section and constify the
> cause variable.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 0c5f94b7b9c3..dd10ecbdce45 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> int xattr_len, int opened)
> {
> static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
> - char *cause = "unknown";
> + const char *cause = "unknown";
> struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
> struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> @@ -241,16 +241,20 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> }
>
> status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
> - if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
> - (status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) &&
> - (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
> - if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
> - || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> - cause = "missing-HMAC";
> - else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
> - cause = "invalid-HMAC";
> + switch (status) {
> + case INTEGRITY_PASS:
> + case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:
> + case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
Wouldn't it be more future-proof to replace this with a 'default', or
to at least add a "default: BUG()" to catch new status values?
> + break;
> + case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */
> + case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */
> + cause = "missing-HMAC";
> + goto out;
> + case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */
> + cause = "invalid-HMAC";
> goto out;
> }
> +
> switch (xattr_value->type) {
> case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
> /* first byte contains algorithm id */
> @@ -316,17 +320,20 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
> op, cause, rc, 0);
> } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
> + /* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
> if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
> (!xattr_value ||
> xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
> if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
> status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> - } else if ((inode->i_size == 0) &&
> - (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
> - (xattr_value &&
> - xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
> + }
> +
> + /* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */
> + if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE &&
This may be correct, but it's not identical to what you're replacing.
Since in either case you're setting status to INTEGRITY_PASS the final
result is the same, but with a few extra possible steps. Not sure
whether that matters.
> + xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) {
> status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> }
> +
> integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
> op, cause, rc, 0);
> } else {
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-14 21:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-14 20:20 [PATCH 0/4] Code improvements in integrity and IMA Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-03-14 20:20 ` [PATCH 1/4] integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-03-14 21:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-14 20:20 ` [PATCH 2/4] ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init() Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-03-14 21:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-14 20:20 ` [PATCH 3/4] ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement() Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-03-14 21:40 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2018-03-15 0:03 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-03-15 19:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-15 20:33 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-03-17 15:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-14 20:20 ` [PATCH 4/4] integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr Thiago Jung Bauermann
2018-03-15 21:01 ` [PATCH 0/4] Code improvements in integrity and IMA Mimi Zohar
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180314214045.GC14289@mail.hallyn.com \
--to=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
Powered by JetHome