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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 73/95] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 23:12:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180521210500.955924566@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180521210447.219380974@linuxfoundation.org>

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 9f65fb29374ee37856dbad847b4e121aab72b510 upstream

Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).

Hence changing it.

It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.

Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.

[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |   10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h   |   12 ++++++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          |   14 +++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         |   36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |    8 ++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c               |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                 |    6 +++---
 11 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW		( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE	( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS		(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD RDS implementation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD		( 7*32+24)  /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDS			(18*32+31) /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		(18*32+31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << 1)   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT		2	   /* Reduced Data Speculation bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT)   /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO		(1 << 4)   /*
 						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * attack, so no Reduced Data Speculation control
-						    * required.
+						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+						    * control required.
 						    */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -17,20 +17,20 @@ extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u
 
 /* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
-static inline u64 rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_RDS < SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
-	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) >> (TIF_RDS - SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 }
 
-static inline u64 rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
 {
-	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask : 0ULL;
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
 }
 
 extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_SIGPENDING		2	/* signal pending */
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	3	/* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		4	/* reenable singlestep on user return*/
-#define TIF_RDS			5	/* Reduced data speculation */
+#define TIF_SSBD			5	/* Reduced data speculation */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU		6	/* syscall emulation active */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING		(1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SINGLESTEP		(1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
-#define _TIF_RDS		(1 << TIF_RDS)
+#define _TIF_SSBD		(1 << TIF_SSBD)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
 #define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 
 /* flags to check in __switch_to() */
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW							\
-	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_RDS)
+	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -567,12 +567,12 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
-		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable RDS.
+		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
 		 */
 		if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
-			x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask = 1ULL << bit;
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
+			x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -894,9 +894,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDS);
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
 	}
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl
 
 /*
  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
- * x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
  */
 u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 	u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		msrval |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		msrval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 	return msrval;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_s
 		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
@@ -174,18 +174,18 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues
 		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
 
-static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void)
+static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 {
-	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 	enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
 	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDS))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
 		return mode;
 
 	cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 	/*
 	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
 	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
-	 *  - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
 	 */
 	if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
@@ -518,12 +518,12 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 		 */
 		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
 		case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
-			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
-			x86_amd_rds_enable();
+			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -556,16 +556,16 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_str
 		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -ERANGE;
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
-		x86_amd_rds_enable();
+		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
 	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
-	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO))
+	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
-		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
 	}
 
 	/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -284,11 +284,11 @@ static __always_inline void __speculativ
 {
 	u64 msr;
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
-		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
 	} else {
-		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
 	}
 }
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct
 	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOCPUID)
 		set_cpuid_faulting(!!(tifn & _TIF_NOCPUID));
 
-	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_RDS)
+	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
 		__speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 
 	/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
-		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(RDS) |
+		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(SSBD) |
 		F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
 
 	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -3295,7 +3295,7 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
 		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
 		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
-		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDS))
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
 			return 1;
 
 		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
@@ -3417,11 +3417,11 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
 		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
 		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
-		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDS))
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
 			return 1;
 
 		/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
-		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_RDS))
+		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
 			return 1;
 
 		vmx->spec_ctrl = data;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-21 21:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.14 00/95] 4.14.43-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 01/95] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 02/95] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 03/95] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 04/95] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 05/95] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 06/95] ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 07/95] ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 08/95] ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.14 09/95] spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 10/95] spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 11/95] spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 12/95] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS save/restore: protect kvm_read_guest() calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 13/95] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 14/95] powerpc: Dont preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 15/95] vfio: ccw: fix cleanup if cp_prefetch fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 16/95] tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 17/95] tee: shm: fix use-after-free via temporarily dropped reference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 18/95] netfilter: nf_tables: free set name in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 19/95] netfilter: nf_tables: cant fail after linking rule into active rule list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 20/95] netfilter: nf_socket: Fix out of bounds access in nf_sk_lookup_slow_v{4,6} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 21/95] i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 22/95] powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 23/95] drm: Match sysfs name in link removal to link creation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 24/95] lib/test_bitmap.c: fix bitmap optimisation tests to report errors correctly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 25/95] radix tree: fix multi-order iteration race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 26/95] mm: dont allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 27/95] drm/i915/gen9: Add WaClearHIZ_WM_CHICKEN3 for bxt and glk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 28/95] s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 29/95] s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 30/95] s390/qdio: dont release memory in qdio_setup_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 31/95] s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 32/95] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 33/95] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 34/95] efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32 definition for mixed mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 35/95] ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/95] x86/mm: Drop TS_COMPAT on 64-bit exec() syscall Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/95] tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/95] ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/95] ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/95] ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/95] Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 42/95] Btrfs: send, fix invalid access to commit roots due to concurrent snapshotting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/95] btrfs: property: Set incompat flag if lzo/zstd compression is set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/95] btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/95] btrfs: Split btrfs_del_delalloc_inode into 2 functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/95] btrfs: Fix delalloc inodes invalidation during transaction abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/95] btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 48/95] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 49/95] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 50/95] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 51/95] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 52/95] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 53/95] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 54/95] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 55/95] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 56/95] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 57/95] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 58/95] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 59/95] x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 60/95] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 61/95] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 62/95] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 63/95] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 64/95] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 65/95] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 66/95] seccomp: Enable " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 67/95] x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 68/95] prctl: Add force disable speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.14 69/95] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 70/95] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 71/95] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 72/95] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 74/95] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 75/95] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 76/95] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 77/95] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 78/95] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 79/95] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 80/95] KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 81/95] x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 82/95] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 83/95] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 84/95] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 85/95] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 86/95] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 87/95] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 88/95] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 89/95] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 90/95] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 91/95] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 92/95] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 93/95] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 94/95] KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.14 95/95] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-22  2:26 ` [PATCH 4.14 00/95] 4.14.43-stable review kernelci.org bot
2018-05-22 11:03 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-05-22 13:29 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-05-22 20:44 ` Shuah Khan

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