From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@freenet.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Spectre mitigation doesn't seem to work at all?!
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 10:19:31 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180604091931.sziimdeei54jgwzn@salmiak> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d8fbee2d-305a-9fc0-356e-b8d4cbd59dbd@maya.org>
On Mon, Jun 04, 2018 at 10:50:07AM +0200, Andreas Hartmann wrote:
> Hello Peter,
>
> thanks for your answer! I appreciate it!
>
> On 06/04/2018 at 10:15 AM Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 02:19:38PM +0200, Andreas Hartmann wrote:
> >
> >> I tested the spectre mitigation of different machines and kernels with
> >> https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC
> >>
> >> You can see the results below.
> >
> >> My question: Did I miss something?
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> >> Build: ... INTEL_MITIGATION_DISABLED LINUX_KERNEL_MITIGATION_DISABLED
> >> Build: ... INTEL_MITIGATION_DISABLED LINUX_KERNEL_MITIGATION_DISABLED
> >> Build: ... INTEL_MITIGATION_DISABLED LINUX_KERNEL_MITIGATION_DISABLED
> >
> > ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
> >
> > The POC is a v1 on itself. V1 needs to be fixed for every individual
> > executable (worse, for every individual location in the code, and we're
> > still finding them). The kernel mitigation status for v1 only indicates
> > the kernel itself has mitigations (for some locations).
> >
> > The POC is meant to test effectiveness of these mitigations, either the
> > original LFENCE or the dependent instruction thing, but you have to
> > enable one or the other.
>
> Ok, this means every program running on the machine has to care itself
> to be spectre v1 - safe.
Correct. Primiarily this matters for things like JITs, where untrusted code may
be run in the same address space as sensitive data.
> A malicious program most probably won't care about that. Therefore, my
> next question is: which memory regions can be exploited by a malicious
> program? The complete physical memory or only the memory provided to the
> malicious program? Should be the latter if this approach should have any
> impact.
Assuming you have a CPU which is not vulnerable to meltdown / variant-3, or you
have mitigated this, (e.g. with KPTI), a malicious program can only access data
within its own address space.
Spectre variant-1 alone only gives access to memory in the address space of the
program itself.
Thanks,
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-04 9:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-01 12:19 Andreas Hartmann
2018-06-04 7:43 ` Andreas Hartmann
2018-06-04 21:25 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-04 8:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-04 8:50 ` Andreas Hartmann
2018-06-04 9:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-04 9:19 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2018-06-04 10:00 ` Andreas Hartmann
2018-06-04 14:12 ` Alan Cox
2018-06-05 5:53 ` Andreas Hartmann
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