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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	"Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>,
	"Matt Helsley (VMware)" <matt.helsley@gmail.com>,
	Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com>, Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 076/107] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 14:42:10 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180723122417.217904473@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180723122413.003644357@linuxfoundation.org>

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 9f65fb29374ee37856dbad847b4e121aab72b510 upstream

Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).

Hence changing it.

It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.

Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.

[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Srivatsa: Backported to 4.4.y, skipping the KVM changes in this patch. ]
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---

 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |   10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h   |   12 ++++++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          |   14 +++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         |   36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |    8 ++++----
 9 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB	( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW	( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE	( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS	(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD RDS implementation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD	(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDS			(18*32+31) /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		(18*32+31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << 1)   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT		2	   /* Reduced Data Speculation bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT)   /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -58,10 +58,10 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO		(1 << 4)   /*
 						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * attack, so no Reduced Data Speculation control
-						    * required.
+						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+						    * control required.
 						    */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -17,20 +17,20 @@ extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u
 
 /* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
-static inline u64 rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_RDS < SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
-	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) >> (TIF_RDS - SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 }
 
-static inline u64 rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
 {
-	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask : 0ULL;
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
 }
 
 extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_SIGPENDING		2	/* signal pending */
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	3	/* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		4	/* reenable singlestep on user return*/
-#define TIF_RDS			5	/* Reduced data speculation */
+#define TIF_SSBD		5	/* Reduced data speculation */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU		6	/* syscall emulation active */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING		(1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SINGLESTEP		(1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
-#define _TIF_RDS		(1 << TIF_RDS)
+#define _TIF_SSBD		(1 << TIF_SSBD)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
 #define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 
 /* flags to check in __switch_to() */
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW							\
-	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_RDS)
+	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -532,12 +532,12 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
-		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable RDS.
+		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
 		 */
 		if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
-			x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask = 1ULL << bit;
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
+			x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -816,9 +816,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDS);
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
 	}
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CT
 
 /*
  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
- * x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
  */
 u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 	u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		msrval |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		msrval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 	return msrval;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_s
 		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
@@ -172,18 +172,18 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues
 		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
 
-static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void)
+static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 {
-	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 	enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
 	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDS))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
 		return mode;
 
 	cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 	/*
 	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
 	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
-	 *  - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
 	 */
 	if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
@@ -516,12 +516,12 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 		 */
 		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
 		case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
-			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
-			x86_amd_rds_enable();
+			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -554,16 +554,16 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_str
 		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -ERANGE;
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
-		x86_amd_rds_enable();
+		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
 	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
-	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO))
+	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
-		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
 	}
 
 	/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -203,11 +203,11 @@ static __always_inline void __speculativ
 {
 	u64 msr;
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
-		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
 	} else {
-		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
 	}
 }
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct
 	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC)
 		cr4_toggle_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
 
-	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_RDS)
+	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
 		__speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
 }
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-07-23 12:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-23 12:40 [PATCH 4.4 000/107] 4.4.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:40 ` [PATCH 4.4 002/107] x86/MCE: Remove min interval polling limitation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:40 ` [PATCH 4.4 003/107] fat: fix memory allocation failure handling of match_strdup() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:40 ` [PATCH 4.4 004/107] ALSA: rawmidi: Change resized buffers atomically Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:40 ` [PATCH 4.4 005/107] ARC: Fix CONFIG_SWAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 006/107] ARC: mm: allow mprotect to make stack mappings executable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 007/107] mm: memcg: fix use after free in mem_cgroup_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 008/107] ipv4: Return EINVAL when ping_group_range sysctl doesnt map to user ns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 009/107] ipv6: fix useless rol32 call on hash Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 010/107] lib/rhashtable: consider param->min_size when setting initial table size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 011/107] net/ipv4: Set oif in fib_compute_spec_dst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 012/107] net: phy: fix flag masking in __set_phy_supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 013/107] ptp: fix missing break in switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 014/107] tg3: Add higher cpu clock for 5762 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 015/107] net: Dont copy pfmemalloc flag in __copy_skb_header() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 016/107] skbuff: Unconditionally copy pfmemalloc in __skb_clone() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 017/107] xhci: Fix perceived dead host due to runtime suspend race with event handler Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 018/107] x86/paravirt: Make native_save_fl() extern inline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-24 23:08   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-08-27 21:06     ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 019/107] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 020/107] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 021/107] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 022/107] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 023/107] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 024/107] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 025/107] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 026/107] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 027/107] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 028/107] x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 029/107] x86/asm/entry/32: Simplify pushes of zeroed pt_regs->REGs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 030/107] x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 031/107] x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 032/107] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 033/107] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 034/107] x86/speculation: Fix up array_index_nospec_mask() asm constraint Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 035/107] x86/speculation: Add <asm/msr-index.h> dependency Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 036/107] x86/xen: Zero MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL before suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 037/107] x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-24 23:44   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-08-26  6:06     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 038/107] x86/mm: Give each mm TLB flush generation a unique ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 041/107] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 042/107] x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 043/107] x86/speculation: Remove Skylake C2 from Speculation Control microcode blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 046/107] xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 047/107] x86/amd: dont set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 048/107] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 049/107] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 050/107] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 051/107] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 052/107] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 053/107] x86/cpu: Rename Merrifield2 to Moorefield Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 054/107] x86/cpu/intel: Add Knights Mill to Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 055/107] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 056/107] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 057/107] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 058/107] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 059/107] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 060/107] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15, 16, 17]h if requested Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 061/107] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 062/107] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 063/107] x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 064/107] x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:41 ` [PATCH 4.4 065/107] x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 066/107] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 067/107] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 068/107] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 069/107] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 070/107] seccomp: Enable " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 071/107] prctl: Add force disable speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 072/107] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 073/107] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 074/107] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 075/107] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 077/107] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 078/107] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 079/107] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 080/107] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 081/107] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 082/107] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 084/107] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 085/107] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 086/107] x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 087/107] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 088/107] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 089/107] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 090/107] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 091/107] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 092/107] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest, restore_host} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 093/107] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 094/107] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 095/107] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 096/107] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 097/107] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 098/107] x86/xen: Add call of speculative_store_bypass_ht_init() to PV paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 099/107] x86/cpu: Re-apply forced caps every time CPU caps are re-read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 100/107] block: do not use interruptible wait anywhere Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 101/107] clk: tegra: Fix PLL_U post divider and initial rate on Tegra30 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 102/107] ubi: Introduce vol_ignored() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 103/107] ubi: Rework Fastmap attach base code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 104/107] ubi: Be more paranoid while seaching for the most recent Fastmap Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 105/107] ubi: Fix races around ubi_refill_pools() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 106/107] ubi: Fix Fastmaps update_vol() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 12:42 ` [PATCH 4.4 107/107] ubi: fastmap: Erase outdated anchor PEBs during attach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-09-04 18:39   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-09-17 11:53     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-07-23 15:11 ` [PATCH 4.4 000/107] 4.4.144-stable review Nathan Chancellor
2018-07-23 22:14 ` Dan Rue
2018-07-24 15:57 ` Guenter Roeck

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