From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70532C4321D for ; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 23:54:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C6782087E for ; Wed, 15 Aug 2018 23:54:02 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8C6782087E Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731239AbeHPCsa (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 22:48:30 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com ([134.134.136.24]:61123 "EHLO mga09.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728014AbeHPCsa (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2018 22:48:30 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga003.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.27]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Aug 2018 16:53:59 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.53,245,1531810800"; d="scan'208";a="75694074" Received: from cschaufl-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com ([10.252.130.105]) by orsmga003.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 15 Aug 2018 16:53:59 -0700 From: Casey Schaufler To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, SMACK-discuss@lists.01.org, casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com, arjan@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH RFC 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel vulnerability Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:53:55 -0700 Message-Id: <20180815235355.14908-6-casey.schaufler@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> References: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they have PROCESS_SHARE access. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a8bf324130f5..7fbd7d7ac1cb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } +static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p) +{ + struct av_decision avd; + + return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), + SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, 0, &avd); +} + /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) @@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), -- 2.17.1