From: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Adam Wallis <awallis@codeaurora.org>,
Amit Kachhap <Amit.Kachhap@arm.com>,
Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
Dave P Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Jacob Bramley <jacob.bramley@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
"Suzuki K . Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC 15/17] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2018 09:47:52 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181005084754.20950-16-kristina.martsenko@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181005084754.20950-1-kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
When the kernel is compiled with pointer auth instructions, the boot CPU
needs to start using pointer auth very early, so change the cpucap to
account for this.
A function that enables pointer auth cannot return, so inline such
functions or compile them without pointer auth.
Do not use the cpu_enable callback, to avoid compiling the whole
callchain down to cpu_enable without pointer auth.
Note the change in behavior: if the boot CPU has pointer auth and a late
CPU does not, we panic. Until now we would have just disabled pointer
auth in this case.
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 9 +++++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 14 ++++----------
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 7 ++++++-
4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 1717ba1db35d..af4ca92a5fa9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -292,6 +292,15 @@ extern struct arm64_ftr_reg arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0;
*/
#define ARM64_CPUCAP_STRICT_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU
+/*
+ * CPU feature used early in the boot based on the boot CPU. It is safe for a
+ * late CPU to have this feature even though the boot CPU hasn't enabled it,
+ * although the feature will not be used by Linux in this case. If the boot CPU
+ * has enabled this feature already, then every late CPU must have it.
+ */
+#define ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE \
+ (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_BOOT_CPU | ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU)
+
struct arm64_cpu_capabilities {
const char *desc;
u16 capability;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
index e60f225d9fa2..0634f06c3af2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
/*
+ * Compile the function without pointer authentication instructions. This
+ * allows pointer authentication to be enabled/disabled within the function
+ * (but leaves the function unprotected by pointer authentication).
+ */
+#define __no_ptrauth __attribute__((target("sign-return-address=none")))
+
+/*
* Each key is a 128-bit quantity which is split across a pair of 64-bit
* registers (Lo and Hi).
*/
@@ -51,6 +58,15 @@ static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
__ptrauth_key_install(APIA, keys->apia);
}
+static __always_inline void ptrauth_cpu_enable(void)
+{
+ if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH))
+ return;
+
+ sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_ENIA);
+ isb();
+}
+
/*
* The EL0 pointer bits used by a pointer authentication code.
* This is dependent on TBI0 being enabled, or bits 63:56 would also apply.
@@ -71,8 +87,10 @@ static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)
ptrauth_keys_init(&(tsk)->thread_info.keys_user)
#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
+#define __no_ptrauth
#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(lr) (lr)
#define ptrauth_task_init_user(tsk)
+#define ptrauth_cpu_enable(tsk)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
#endif /* __ASM_POINTER_AUTH_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 3157685aa56a..380ee01145e8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -1040,15 +1040,10 @@ static void cpu_has_fwb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
-static void cpu_enable_address_auth(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)
-{
- sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_ENIA);
-}
-
static bool has_address_auth(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int __unused)
{
- u64 isar1 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);
+ u64 isar1 = read_sysreg(id_aa64isar1_el1);
bool api, apa;
apa = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar1,
@@ -1251,7 +1246,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
{
.desc = "Address authentication (architected algorithm)",
.capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH,
- .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
+ .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE,
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1,
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT,
@@ -1261,7 +1256,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
{
.desc = "Address authentication (IMP DEF algorithm)",
.capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF,
- .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
+ .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE,
.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1,
.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT,
@@ -1270,9 +1265,8 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
},
{
.capability = ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH,
- .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
+ .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE,
.matches = has_address_auth,
- .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_address_auth,
},
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
{},
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
index 25fcd22a4bb2..09690024dce8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#include <asm/numa.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/smp_plat.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -211,6 +212,8 @@ asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void)
*/
check_local_cpu_capabilities();
+ ptrauth_cpu_enable();
+
if (cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_postboot)
cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_postboot();
@@ -405,7 +408,7 @@ void __init smp_cpus_done(unsigned int max_cpus)
mark_linear_text_alias_ro();
}
-void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
+void __init __no_ptrauth smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
{
set_my_cpu_offset(per_cpu_offset(smp_processor_id()));
/*
@@ -414,6 +417,8 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
*/
jump_label_init();
cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu();
+
+ ptrauth_cpu_enable();
}
static u64 __init of_get_cpu_mpidr(struct device_node *dn)
--
2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-05 8:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-05 8:47 [PATCH 00/17] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication support Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 01/17] arm64: add pointer authentication register bits Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-11 16:28 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-12 8:53 ` Mark Rutland
2018-10-12 8:56 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-12 9:50 ` Mark Rutland
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 02/17] arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 03/17] arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 04/17] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2 Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 05/17] arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 06/17] asm-generic: mm_hooks: allow hooks to be overridden individually Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 07/17] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-11 16:00 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-10-19 11:15 ` Catalin Marinas
2018-10-19 11:24 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-19 15:36 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-19 15:49 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-19 16:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-19 16:16 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-19 15:54 ` Mark Rutland
2018-10-19 16:49 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-11-14 18:11 ` Will Deacon
2018-11-15 10:25 ` Dave Martin
2018-10-23 8:36 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2018-10-23 10:20 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 08/17] arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 09/17] arm64: perf: strip PAC when unwinding userspace Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 10/17] arm64: enable pointer authentication Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [PATCH v5 11/17] arm64: docs: document " Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 9:04 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2018-10-16 16:14 ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-19 11:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2018-10-19 11:47 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-10-19 12:22 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-19 14:42 ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-19 15:10 ` Catalin Marinas
2018-10-19 17:45 ` Will Deacon
2018-11-02 6:02 ` Jon Masters
2018-10-24 10:56 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2018-10-15 22:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-11-02 9:46 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [RFC 12/17] arm64: move ptrauth keys to thread_info Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-19 11:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [RFC 13/17] arm64: install user ptrauth keys at kernel exit time Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [RFC 14/17] arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 8:47 ` Kristina Martsenko [this message]
2018-10-06 12:51 ` [RFC 15/17] arm64: enable ptrauth earlier Amit Kachhap
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [RFC 16/17] arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-06 12:56 ` Amit Kachhap
2018-10-05 8:47 ` [RFC 17/17] arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth -msign-return-address Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-05 9:01 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
2018-10-11 14:00 ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-10-11 14:23 ` Vladimir Murzin
2018-10-15 22:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-15 22:42 ` [PATCH 00/17] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication support Kees Cook
2018-11-13 16:17 ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-11-13 23:09 ` Kees Cook
2018-11-14 15:54 ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-11-14 21:47 ` Mark Rutland
2018-11-14 22:48 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-19 12:36 ` Will Deacon
2018-10-23 8:39 ` Ramana Radhakrishnan
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