From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DD1BC5ACCC for ; Thu, 18 Oct 2018 05:02:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0AE9121473 for ; Thu, 18 Oct 2018 05:02:12 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0AE9121473 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=davemloft.net Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727440AbeJRNBS (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Oct 2018 09:01:18 -0400 Received: from shards.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.9]:54616 "EHLO shards.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727328AbeJRNBR (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Oct 2018 09:01:17 -0400 Received: from localhost (unknown [IPv6:2601:601:9f80:35cd::cf9]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) (Authenticated sender: davem-davemloft) by shards.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2A87E1008E607; Wed, 17 Oct 2018 22:02:10 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 22:02:09 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <20181017.220209.613250133167153238.davem@davemloft.net> To: gustavo@embeddedor.com Cc: richardcochran@gmail.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] ptp: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability From: David Miller In-Reply-To: <20181016130641.GA603@embeddedor.com> References: <20181016130641.GA603@embeddedor.com> X-Mailer: Mew version 6.7 on Emacs 26 / Mule 6.0 (HANACHIRUSATO) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.12 (shards.monkeyblade.net [149.20.54.216]); Wed, 17 Oct 2018 22:02:10 -0700 (PDT) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 15:06:41 +0200 > pin_index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading > to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:253 ptp_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue > 'ops->pin_config' [r] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing pin_index before using it to index > ops->pin_config, and before passing it as an argument to > function ptp_set_pinfunc(), in which it is used to index > info->pin_config. > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Applied.