mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH] seq_buf: Make seq_buf_puts() NULL terminate the buffer
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 23:10:00 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181017121000.30240-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au> (raw)

Currently seq_buf_puts() will happily create a non NULL terminated
string for you in the buffer. This is particularly dangerous if the
buffer is on the stack.

For example:

  char buf[8];
  char secret = "secret";
  struct seq_buf s;

  seq_buf_init(&s, buf, sizeof(buf));
  seq_buf_puts(&s, "foo");
  printk("Message is %s\n", buf);

Can result in:

  Message is fooªªªªªsecret

We could require all users to memset() their buffer to NULL before
use. But that seems likely to be forgotten and lead to bugs.

Instead we can change seq_buf_puts() to always leave the buffer in a
NULL terminated state.

The only downside is that this makes the buffer 1 character smaller
for seq_buf_puts(), but that seems like a good trade off.

Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
---
 lib/seq_buf.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

I recently merged a patch which actually hit this behaviour. I worked
around it by using seq_buf_printf(), but it would be good to fix the
problem at the source.

diff --git a/lib/seq_buf.c b/lib/seq_buf.c
index 11f2ae0f9099..b1570204cde3 100644
--- a/lib/seq_buf.c
+++ b/lib/seq_buf.c
@@ -144,9 +144,13 @@ int seq_buf_puts(struct seq_buf *s, const char *str)
 
 	WARN_ON(s->size == 0);
 
+	/* Add 1 to len for the trailing NULL which must be there */
+	len += 1;
+
 	if (seq_buf_can_fit(s, len)) {
 		memcpy(s->buffer + s->len, str, len);
-		s->len += len;
+		/* Don't count the trailing NULL against the capacity */
+		s->len += len - 1;
 		return 0;
 	}
 	seq_buf_set_overflow(s);
-- 
2.17.1


             reply	other threads:[~2018-10-17 12:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-17 12:10 Michael Ellerman [this message]
2018-10-17 12:26 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-17 12:42   ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-19  4:17   ` Michael Ellerman
2018-10-17 14:48 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-10-19  0:35 ` Kees Cook

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20181017121000.30240-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au \
    --to=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®