From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32B1EECDE43 for ; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:21:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 043D02145D for ; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:21:19 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 043D02145D Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=ellerman.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727112AbeJSMZd (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Oct 2018 08:25:33 -0400 Received: from ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:57327 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727017AbeJSMZc (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Oct 2018 08:25:32 -0400 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1034) id 42bt5Q3J4Rz9sDK; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 15:21:14 +1100 (AEDT) From: Michael Ellerman To: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] seq_buf: Use size_t for len in seq_buf_puts() Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 15:21:09 +1100 Message-Id: <20181019042109.8064-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.2 In-Reply-To: <20181019042109.8064-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au> References: <20181019042109.8064-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Jann Horn points out that we're using unsigned int for len in seq_buf_puts(), which could potentially overflow if we're passed a UINT_MAX sized string. The rest of the code already uses size_t, so we should also use that in seq_buf_puts() to avoid any issues. Suggested-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman --- lib/seq_buf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) v2: New in v2. diff --git a/lib/seq_buf.c b/lib/seq_buf.c index 6aabb609dd87..bd807f545a9d 100644 --- a/lib/seq_buf.c +++ b/lib/seq_buf.c @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int seq_buf_bprintf(struct seq_buf *s, const char *fmt, const u32 *binary) */ int seq_buf_puts(struct seq_buf *s, const char *str) { - unsigned int len = strlen(str); + size_t len = strlen(str); WARN_ON(s->size == 0); -- 2.17.2