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Date:   Fri, 19 Oct 2018 09:57:40 +0200
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To:     Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:     Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
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Subject: Re: [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to
 enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection
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On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 10:59:28AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> Application to application exploit is in general difficult due to address
> space layout randomization in applications and the need to know an

Does the BTB attack on KASLR not work for userspace?