From: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
To: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] Implement /proc/pid/kill
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 14:42:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181030214243.GB32621@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181030204501.jnbe7dyqui47hd2x@yavin>
On Wed, Oct 31, 2018 at 07:45:01AM +1100, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
[...]
> > > (Unfortunately
> > > there are lots of things that make it a bit difficult to use /proc/$pid
> > > exclusively for introspection of a process -- especially in the context
> > > of containers.)
> >
> > Tons of things already break without a working /proc. What do you have in mind?
>
> Heh, if only that was the only blocker. :P
>
> The basic problem is that currently container runtimes either depend on
> some non-transient on-disk state (which becomes invalid on machine
> reboots or dead processes and so on), or on long-running processes that
> keep file descriptors required for administration of a container alive
> (think O_PATH to /dev/pts/ptmx to avoid malicious container filesystem
> attacks). Usually both.
>
> What would be really useful would be having some way of "hiding away" a
> mount namespace (of the pid1 of the container) that has all of the
> information and bind-mounts-to-file-descriptors that are necessary for
> administration. If the container's pid1 dies all of the transient state
> has disappeared automatically -- because the stashed mount namespace has
> died. In addition, if this was done the way I'm thinking with (and this
> is the contentious bit) hierarchical mount namespaces you could make it
> so that the pid1 could not manipulate its current mount namespace to
> confuse the administrative process. You would also then create an
> intermediate user namespace to help with several race conditions (that
> have caused security bugs like CVE-2016-9962) we've seen when joining
> containers.
>
> Unfortunately this all depends on hierarchical mount namespaces (and
> note that this would just be that NS_GET_PARENT gives you the mount
> namespace that it was created in -- I'm not suggesting we redesign peers
> or anything like that). This makes it basically a non-starter.
>
> But if, on top of this ground-work, we then referenced containers
> entirely via an fd to /proc/$pid then you could also avoid PID reuse
> races (as well as being able to find out implicitly whether a container
> has died thanks to the error semantics of /proc/$pid). And that's the
> way I would suggest doing it (if we had these other things in place).
I didn't fully follow exactly what you mean. If you can explain for the
layman who doesn't know much experience with containers..
Are you saying that keeping open a /proc/$pid directory handle is not
sufficient to prevent PID reuse while the proc entries under /proc/$pid are
being looked into? If its not sufficient, then isn't that a bug? If it is
sufficient, then can we not just keep the handle open while we do whatever we
want under /proc/$pid ?
- Joel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-30 21:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-29 22:10 Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 3:21 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30 8:50 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 10:39 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 10:40 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 10:48 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 11:04 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 11:12 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 11:19 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-31 5:00 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-30 17:01 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30 5:00 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30 9:05 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 20:45 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30 21:42 ` Joel Fernandes [this message]
2018-10-30 22:23 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-30 22:33 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-30 22:49 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31 0:42 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31 1:59 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 23:10 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-30 23:23 ` Christian Brauner
2018-10-30 23:55 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 2:56 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31 4:24 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-01 20:40 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-11-02 9:46 ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-02 14:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-10-31 0:57 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31 1:56 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 4:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31 4:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31 12:44 ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-31 13:27 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-31 15:16 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:49 ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-11-01 11:53 ` David Laight
2018-11-01 15:50 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 14:37 ` [PATCH v2] " Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 15:05 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31 17:33 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-31 21:47 ` Joel Fernandes
2018-10-31 15:59 ` [PATCH v3] " Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 17:54 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-31 18:00 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 18:17 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-31 19:33 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-10-31 20:06 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-11-01 11:33 ` David Laight
2018-11-12 1:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-10-31 16:22 ` [RFC PATCH] " Jann Horn
2018-11-01 4:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-12 23:13 ` Pavel Machek
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