From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com,
arjan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 2/5] Smack: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 11:05:01 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181105190504.500-3-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181105190504.500-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
A ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED gets called
from process switching code. This precludes the use of audit,
as the locking is incompatible. Don't do audit in the PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
case.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 340fc30ad85d..ffa95bcab599 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -422,7 +422,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
struct task_smack *tsp;
struct smack_known *tracer_known;
- if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
+ if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0 &&
+ (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) == 0) {
smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
saip = &ad;
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-05 19:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-05 19:04 [PATCH v6 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:05 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel Casey Schaufler
2018-11-05 19:52 ` Randy Dunlap
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