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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 22/24] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation
Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 13:26:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181122122638.GC10365@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181121201724.414692525@linutronix.de>

On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 09:14:52PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> 
> Add the PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
> PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
> indirect branch speculation via STIBP.
> 
> Invocations:
>  Check indirect branch speculation status with
>  - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
> 
>  Enable indirect branch speculation with
>  - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
> 
>  Disable indirect branch speculation with
>  - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
> 
>  Force disable indirect branch speculation with
>  - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
> 
> See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> ---
>  Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst |    9 +++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h      |    1 
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                |   71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/sched.h                     |    9 +++
>  include/uapi/linux/prctl.h                |    1 
>  tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h          |    1 
>  6 files changed, 92 insertions(+)

> @@ -753,12 +755,56 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_str
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static int indir_branch_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
> +{
> +	switch (ctrl) {
> +	case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
> +		if (spectre_v2_app2app == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE)
> +			return 0;
> +		/*
> +		 * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
> +		 * mode.
> +		 */
> +		if (spectre_v2_app2app == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT)
> +			return -EPERM;
> +		task_clear_spec_indir_branch_disable(task);
> +		task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SPEC_IB, false);
> +		break;
> +	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
> +		/*
> +		 * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
> +		 * mitigation is force disabled.
> +		 */
> +		if (spectre_v2_app2app == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE)
> +			return -EPERM;
> +		if (spectre_v2_app2app == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT)
> +			return 0;
> +		task_set_spec_indir_branch_disable(task);
> +		task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SPEC_IB, true);
> +		break;
> +	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
> +		if (spectre_v2_app2app == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE)
> +			return -EPERM;
> +		if (spectre_v2_app2app == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT)
> +			return 0;
> +		task_set_spec_indir_branch_disable(task);
> +		task_set_spec_indir_branch_force_disable(task);
> +		task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SPEC_IB, true);
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		return -ERANGE;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
> +}

Perhaps merge the two DISABLE branches to make it obvious what the
difference between them is:

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 6eac074e3935..28cece3a067b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -769,7 +769,9 @@ static int indir_branch_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 		task_clear_spec_indir_branch_disable(task);
 		task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SPEC_IB, false);
 		break;
+
 	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
 		/*
 		 * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
 		 * mitigation is force disabled.
@@ -780,16 +782,11 @@ static int indir_branch_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 			return 0;
 		task_set_spec_indir_branch_disable(task);
 		task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SPEC_IB, true);
+
+		if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
+			task_set_spec_indir_branch_force_disable(task);
 		break;
-	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
-		if (spectre_v2_app2app == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_NONE)
-			return -EPERM;
-		if (spectre_v2_app2app == SPECTRE_V2_APP2APP_STRICT)
-			return 0;
-		task_set_spec_indir_branch_disable(task);
-		task_set_spec_indir_branch_force_disable(task);
-		task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SPEC_IB, true);
-		break;
+
 	default:
 		return -ERANGE;
 	}

> @@ -1453,6 +1453,8 @@ static inline bool is_percpu_thread(void
>  #define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB			2	/* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
>  #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE		3	/* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */
>  #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE	4	/* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/
> +#define PFA_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_DISABLE	5	/* Indirect branch speculation restricted */
> +#define PFA_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH_FORCE_DISABLE 6	/* Indirect branch speculation permanentely restricted */

permanently

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-22 12:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 95+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-21 20:14 [patch 00/24] x86/speculation: Remedy the STIBP/IBPB overhead Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 01/24] x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:28   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 20:30     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:33     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 22:48       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:53         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 22:55           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:55           ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-11-21 22:56             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 23:07               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 23:04         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-11-21 23:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 17:30             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-11-22 17:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 21:17                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 02/24] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 03/24] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 04/24] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 05/24] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-21 20:36     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 22:01       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 06/24] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 07/24] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 08/24] sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 09/24] x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 10/24] sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:41   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 11/24] x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 12/24] x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 13/24] x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 14/24] x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:59   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 15/24] x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 23:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22  8:14     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:07       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:18       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-22 10:10         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-22 10:48           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 16/24] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:57   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 17/24] x86/speculation: Move IBPB control out of switch_mm() Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  0:01   ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-22  7:42     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-22  9:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  1:40   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:52   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 22:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 18/24] x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  1:23   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:44     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 19/24] ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 20/24] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  2:13   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22 23:00     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-23  7:37       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-26 18:35         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-26 21:55           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27  7:05             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27  7:13               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27  7:30                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 12:52                   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 13:18                     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 21:57                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-27 22:07                       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 22:20                         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-27 22:36                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-28  1:50                           ` Tim Chen
2018-11-28 10:43                             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-28  6:05                           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-28 14:33                       ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content tip-bot for Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:43   ` [patch 20/24] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:04     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-23  7:37       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 21/24] x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:34   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:17     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22 23:28       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 22/24] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:10   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22  9:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-22  9:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22 12:26   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2018-11-22 12:33     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 23/24] x86/speculation: Enable PRCTL mode for spectre_v2_app2app Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  7:17   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-21 20:14 ` [patch 24/24] x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 app to app protection mode Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  2:24   ` Tim Chen
2018-11-22  7:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-22 23:45     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-21 23:48 ` [patch 00/24] x86/speculation: Remedy the STIBP/IBPB overhead Tim Chen
2018-11-22  9:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-22  9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra

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