From: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Adam Wallis <awallis@codeaurora.org>,
Amit Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>,
Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave P Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>,
Jacob Bramley <jacob.bramley@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 09/13] arm64: perf: strip PAC when unwinding userspace
Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 18:39:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181207183931.4285-10-kristina.martsenko@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181207183931.4285-1-kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
When the kernel is unwinding userspace callchains, we can't expect that
the userspace consumer of these callchains has the data necessary to
strip the PAC from the stored LR.
This patch has the kernel strip the PAC from user stackframes when the
in-kernel unwinder is used. This only affects the LR value, and not the
FP.
This only affects the in-kernel unwinder. When userspace performs
unwinding, it is up to userspace to strip PACs as necessary (which can
be determined from DWARF information).
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 7 +++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c | 6 +++++-
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
index 5721228836c1..89190d93c850 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h
@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ static inline void ptrauth_keys_switch(struct ptrauth_keys *keys)
*/
#define ptrauth_pac_mask() GENMASK(54, VA_BITS)
+/* Only valid for EL0 TTBR0 instruction pointers */
+static inline unsigned long ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(unsigned long ptr)
+{
+ return ptr & ~ptrauth_pac_mask();
+}
+
#define ptrauth_thread_init_user(tsk) \
do { \
struct task_struct *__ptiu_tsk = (tsk); \
@@ -76,6 +82,7 @@ do { \
ptrauth_keys_switch(&(tsk)->thread_info.keys_user)
#else /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
+#define ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(lr) (lr)
#define ptrauth_thread_init_user(tsk)
#define ptrauth_thread_switch(tsk)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c
index bcafd7dcfe8b..94754f07f67a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
struct frame_tail {
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ user_backtrace(struct frame_tail __user *tail,
{
struct frame_tail buftail;
unsigned long err;
+ unsigned long lr;
/* Also check accessibility of one struct frame_tail beyond */
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, tail, sizeof(buftail)))
@@ -47,7 +49,9 @@ user_backtrace(struct frame_tail __user *tail,
if (err)
return NULL;
- perf_callchain_store(entry, buftail.lr);
+ lr = ptrauth_strip_insn_pac(buftail.lr);
+
+ perf_callchain_store(entry, lr);
/*
* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
--
2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-12-07 18:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-12-07 18:39 [PATCH v6 00/13] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] arm64: add comments about EC exception levels Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-09 14:34 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] arm64: add pointer authentication register bits Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-09 14:24 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-10 19:54 ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-11 20:08 ` Will Deacon
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-08 10:31 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-12-09 14:35 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-08 10:32 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-12-09 14:53 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-10 20:12 ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-10 20:22 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-10 20:30 ` Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-19 15:21 ` Peter Maydell
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2 Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-09 14:54 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-09 14:58 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-09 14:59 ` Richard Henderson
2019-01-03 20:29 ` Pavel Machek
2019-01-04 9:21 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-01-04 9:33 ` Pavel Machek
2019-01-04 18:02 ` Mark Rutland
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-09 15:03 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-09 15:41 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-10 12:03 ` Catalin Marinas
2018-12-10 14:22 ` Richard Henderson
2018-12-10 14:29 ` Will Deacon
2018-12-10 16:09 ` Catalin Marinas
2018-12-07 18:39 ` Kristina Martsenko [this message]
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] arm64: add prctl control for resetting ptrauth keys Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-12 15:22 ` Dave Martin
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] arm64: add ptrace regsets for ptrauth key management Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-12 15:23 ` Dave Martin
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] arm64: enable pointer authentication Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-07 18:39 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] arm64: docs: document " Kristina Martsenko
2018-12-12 19:35 ` [PATCH v6 00/13] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Will Deacon
2018-12-13 18:01 ` Will Deacon
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