From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE629C43444 for ; Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:43:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97D302084C for ; Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:43:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732795AbfAKNnP (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Jan 2019 08:43:15 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:33096 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732127AbfAKNnO (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Jan 2019 08:43:14 -0500 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 94B043B717; Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:43:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com (ovpn-12-80.pek2.redhat.com [10.72.12.80]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7B7BB5C8BC; Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:43:07 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 21:43:03 +0800 From: Dave Young To: Kairui Song Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, bauerman@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify Message-ID: <20190111134303.GA12760@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> References: <20190109164824.19708-1-kasong@redhat.com> <20190109164824.19708-3-kasong@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190109164824.19708-3-kasong@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.5 (2018-04-13) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.16 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.30]); Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:43:13 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 01/10/19 at 12:48am, Kairui Song wrote: > kexec_file_load will need to verify the kernel signed with third part > keys, and the keys could be stored in firmware, then got loaded into > the .platform keyring. Now we have a .platform_trusted_keyring > as the reference to .platform keyring, this patch makes use if it and > allow kexec_file_load to verify the image against keys in .platform > keyring. > > This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous > VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature > should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease > the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY, > so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it > won't generate extra noises. > > Signed-off-by: Kairui Song > --- > arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++--- > certs/system_keyring.c | 7 ++++++- > include/linux/verification.h | 1 + > 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > index 7d97e432cbbc..a8a5c1773ccc 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > @@ -534,9 +534,16 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data) > #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG > static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) > { > - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, > - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, > - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); > + int ret; > + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, > + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, > + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); > + if (ret == -ENOKEY) { > + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, > + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, > + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); > + } > + return ret; > } > #endif > > diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c > index a61b95390b80..7514e69e719f 100644 > --- a/certs/system_keyring.c > +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > > static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys; > @@ -239,12 +240,16 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, > trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys; > #else > trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; > +#endif > +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING > + } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) { > + trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys; > #endif > } > ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys); > if (ret < 0) { > if (ret == -ENOKEY) > - pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); > + pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); > goto error; > } > > diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h > index cfa4730d607a..018fb5f13d44 100644 > --- a/include/linux/verification.h > +++ b/include/linux/verification.h > @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ > * should be used. > */ > #define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL) > +#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ((struct key *)2UL) > > /* > * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put. > -- > 2.20.1 > Personally I would like to see platform key separated from integrity. But for the kexec_file part I think it is good at least it works with this fix. Acked-by: Dave Young Thanks Dave