From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_PASS,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EF9DC4360F for ; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:05:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EC722087C for ; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:05:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=oracle.com header.i=@oracle.com header.b="IXjiUrGn" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727489AbfCKPFS (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Mar 2019 11:05:18 -0400 Received: from userp2120.oracle.com ([156.151.31.85]:55098 "EHLO userp2120.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727334AbfCKPFQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Mar 2019 11:05:16 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (userp2120.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by userp2120.oracle.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x2BExMnA196164; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:04:48 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : mime-version : content-type : content-transfer-encoding; s=corp-2018-07-02; bh=dkNTI9hfL7yMYgz3bH/3kpbhgtMq3F+gihiXrcFhaGQ=; b=IXjiUrGnlb8Q6JuBJTPKUDeudR6ltQG2LLaLVnAANxCcnLrE/TN0LX5AM7s5xSn30q9I 8qLdnSBKu7ahoWsF8SMGBWVZ45t3HgANkuLHlAlITmGBT63kzpGwhjZMQ0kNhd1asUE5 6YbJPZ/2ty522sV8vokOvoCi1FuJmTWyPzVGGzT7fbgWrUiBwEh1HO22L2vRWRe/ve1g CjuG1vA6JQGb0YpYv1kZ/350up6AGI/zhE3On6d3l3Lem+ZtGUyvlwc/s4XffrT9C8CB FRZX+opQmj7+1hRBHyxIXxo7xbYnsvpyrYiResKs8jIsH+izkT+GByZSq29Go+xfyugu nQ== Received: from aserv0021.oracle.com (aserv0021.oracle.com [141.146.126.233]) by userp2120.oracle.com with ESMTP id 2r464r6xmj-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:04:47 +0000 Received: from userv0121.oracle.com (userv0121.oracle.com [156.151.31.72]) by aserv0021.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id x2BF4kaS014055 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:04:46 GMT Received: from abhmp0014.oracle.com (abhmp0014.oracle.com [141.146.116.20]) by userv0121.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.13.8) with ESMTP id x2BF4hxZ016688; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:04:43 GMT Received: from jambi.us.oracle.com (/10.152.34.61) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 08:04:43 -0700 From: Ross Philipson To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, corbet@lwn.net, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, daniel.kiper@oracle.com, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, ross.philipson@oracle.com Subject: [PATCH 0/1] [RFC] Secure Launch boot protocol Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 11:04:22 -0400 Message-Id: <20190311150423.15979-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=5900 definitions=9192 signatures=668685 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1903110109 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org All, As is noted in the patch that follows, the open source project called Trenchboot aims to make Linux directly bootable into a secure late launch environment via Intel TXT or AMD SKINIT. This new feature is referred to as Secure Launch as seen in the subject lines. In addition to changes to the Linux kernel to support this feature, boot loaders will also have additional functionality to initiate the secure late launch. The patch that follows introduces a new boot parameter. There are of course other patches that add further functionality to achieve our aims including the changes to boot loaders that consume this parameter. This posting is as an early RFC to elicit feedback on whether this is an acceptable approach for our boot protocol and an acceptable usage of boot parameters. The project is in its early stages; it is hosted here: https://github.com/trenchboot For an overview of the Secure Launch architecture: https://github.com/TrenchBoot/documentation/blob/master/documentation/Architecture.md" Links: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/guides/intel-txt-software-development-guide.pdf https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf Thank you, Ross Philipson Ross Philipson (1): x86: Secure Launch boot protocol Documentation/x86/boot.txt | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/boot/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/boot/header.S | 3 ++- arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.13.6