From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39E22C282E5 for ; Mon, 27 May 2019 00:57:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11BBC2075C for ; Mon, 27 May 2019 00:57:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="Z3+uRtfp" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726129AbfE0A5g (ORCPT ); Sun, 26 May 2019 20:57:36 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-f195.google.com ([209.85.215.195]:42338 "EHLO mail-pg1-f195.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725981AbfE0A5g (ORCPT ); Sun, 26 May 2019 20:57:36 -0400 Received: by mail-pg1-f195.google.com with SMTP id 33so5129415pgv.9; Sun, 26 May 2019 17:57:36 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version:content-disposition :user-agent; bh=BdjqEMSeAFloAhLZoevUhTsAoKWad+eEnvBrlK9h5Ls=; b=Z3+uRtfpG79M7BNLIRnXyfJ9sPDoZrhkSCxOgvoFc9SEyNIX2smauSYR+5ZY3OLoe0 UZChnQV1zzNhZrbp/xrh9u26hkGf8dUSGIBdoNVwci9UKzRHSrKOaCkru8Lluk2UE4/D bmLzhEnYbWZXEw/3ywuMnG4N9Zxzpkve9Rftj4M6o6ixVFRKcB+7QZnfEnIklbbWAret faFm7mAtkrGKATtivbzexGyhYujoiW//bfBGlZoQuYtCW7odICmr5TLt32KzrW+EOdmg U2VVdTyZ6ymi4MnJ9oUpFBvLouEDvK1yC7tNdLZ02mL9oJ9K+l2LEouEYzD+IwFRYtgn z0NA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version :content-disposition:user-agent; bh=BdjqEMSeAFloAhLZoevUhTsAoKWad+eEnvBrlK9h5Ls=; b=lgKJuLSfvo/LvK0JmVwdXgX34K+0+15hukgFztvIqzSraUPshALQbYNBm+9+J45CJe EgO02HaglqWEGzsTaPkHN6Yac+j2i895pFg97aixOAduy7CyKPk1NH/8x+PfCkUUtrJX sZQBPvgbHYYjmIlldRcnMjeVidpjt3wFc81mLwhBklQdWZ1tONKaatBGxDGlIIsqb3K+ mapGwGYn4zTWos2bHUJr/r0iTqQ4htSWhUsw0ujqRb955Iwy+qfKFNvu/IG+Pk7NJF3N SgekBT4g7ubifL2H3M6vdkKF9CZFctK4DKsDmOy22PcM/kyB3Y8iQPDlTN3t8Y0PD+jp eI1Q== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVmVW6uLZ2sHLEnTX0D54ufVNo7X7y10BL8BT0uogLrmI/t4aEL qqvQ/1XYy24DcJAAKInPnrY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzy0BSN74KBEcCSKAmYIkrOIxBJWNt1E4+MRrkVmkqFsW4+GF+XXP/1yV6kW5FKUr5oW2NP2w== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:8a11:: with SMTP id m17mr110690092pfa.122.1558918655871; Sun, 26 May 2019 17:57:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from zhanggen-UX430UQ ([66.42.35.75]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e123sm8962355pgc.29.2019.05.26.17.57.26 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 26 May 2019 17:57:35 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 08:57:16 +0800 From: Gen Zhang To: sathya.prakash@broadcom.com, chaitra.basappa@broadcom.com, suganath-prabu.subramani@broadcom.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, martin.petersen@oracle.com Cc: MPT-FusionLinux.pdl@broadcom.com, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] mpt3sas_ctl: fix double-fetch bug in _ctl_ioctl_main() Message-ID: <20190527005716.GA17015@zhanggen-UX430UQ> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In _ctl_ioctl_main(), 'ioctl_header' is fetched the first time from userspace. 'ioctl_header.ioc_number' is then checked. The legal result is saved to 'ioc'. Then, in condition MPT3COMMAND, the whole struct is fetched again from the userspace. Then _ctl_do_mpt_command() is called, 'ioc' and 'karg' as inputs. However, a malicious user can change the 'ioc_number' between the two fetches, which will cause a potential security issues. Moreover, a malicious user can provide a valid 'ioc_number' to pass the check in first fetch, and then modify it in the second fetch. To fix this, we need to recheck the 'ioc_number' in the second fetch. Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang --- diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c index b2bb47c..5181c03 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c @@ -2319,6 +2319,10 @@ _ctl_ioctl_main(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg, break; } + if (karg.hdr.ioc_number != ioctl_header.ioc_number) { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) == sizeof(struct mpt3_ioctl_command)) { uarg = arg; ret = _ctl_do_mpt_command(ioc, karg, &uarg->mf);