From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F0E0C28CC0 for ; Thu, 30 May 2019 01:10:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E501243E0 for ; Thu, 30 May 2019 01:10:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="kUVyJwmS" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727281AbfE3BKz (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 21:10:55 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-f193.google.com ([209.85.215.193]:43482 "EHLO mail-pg1-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726527AbfE3BKz (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 21:10:55 -0400 Received: by mail-pg1-f193.google.com with SMTP id f25so922419pgv.10; Wed, 29 May 2019 18:10:55 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version:content-disposition :user-agent; bh=9q3n6/Atan/BZx1c7DELwhCkfQhZCdsRzVyU+FH+w8E=; b=kUVyJwmSi9HfWvdvfbVdt5vH1mMxcA8Sio6yz3d2YqSTPgJCoxRQVYWakSZsk8/bnx klALrwxz3k9VRfeqFpqkdInMF3aI7iS4DATYpm3v1Aw0q1JQuw1jBcWfPXavpDDhVx7a GNq45ww6ueUZbKHuA071AMYqZsDCZ9XN7pttbpnTvOoiCQbKVME/DuOeCw9xqQPjLKpw rKtOICQFiygbSrO4z2qPaTwZH1bCIXpDjM0CyDo7qs9v3wqNODnQVjTRzTr+EqRZmAmZ UccWq2bDhqHydbAQrJ2b9RvTDuUQT3/z9F6xHMlj6gcKQUf0RYPxmQwhisf7xTMv4mEn fGwA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:mime-version :content-disposition:user-agent; bh=9q3n6/Atan/BZx1c7DELwhCkfQhZCdsRzVyU+FH+w8E=; b=cnH+WXRO+z1OIdKkwYTL1NHderVm92lfZMuoEJyevjyGSPwcUcxAZ0Hu1frzDI4Gre 9c8Yn4xJfRna0uk8zCuXcwTYt4pBrmgm0xCI6smlTAe56WcDsby5SL/2HSToiEy382Cz x2yuk+lEc1xLKnheb3aNrkkOcMxcL4C+Rw1V2g/sR0HUeiuvMEnPiAyB1ks9N0mh7FIf Q5I6wJi4iQc1PdnAPhq6iXoAeXqBHeBQvnq4GNj9+GkrNxdrQDsRF+ck4UdD0ttiUSza DwVxO2NSuT+7Lg+z4mJswrYKWcPmKLm93va6lz/bRXge2p6reHbjwgNU1PSmqqlaVO4X ayWw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAX8BSHRJCPT9TYBwJvRyloFxnDQoLJbyVcio/88Kap90z7i/gVv wgo1zwyPkbnwtvujDUC5s1Q= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxt86dxGzN3ZWm9yu9CjEHxpW6lyXo6EdYMJskIILsFaDt25aud9T1smPRolla3NA18/q5zhw== X-Received: by 2002:a65:6382:: with SMTP id h2mr990283pgv.355.1559178654745; Wed, 29 May 2019 18:10:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from zhanggen-UX430UQ ([66.42.35.75]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id l8sm510250pgb.76.2019.05.29.18.10.42 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 29 May 2019 18:10:53 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 09:10:30 +0800 From: Gen Zhang To: sathya.prakash@broadcom.com, chaitra.basappa@broadcom.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, martin.petersen@oracle.com Cc: suganath-prabu.subramani@broadcom.com, MPT-FusionLinux.pdl@broadcom.com, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] mpt3sas_ctl: fix double-fetch bug in _ctl_ioctl_main() Message-ID: <20190530011030.GA6314@zhanggen-UX430UQ> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In _ctl_ioctl_main(), 'ioctl_header' is fetched the first time from userspace. 'ioctl_header.ioc_number' is then checked. The legal result is saved to 'ioc'. Then, in condition MPT3COMMAND, the whole struct is fetched again from the userspace. Then _ctl_do_mpt_command() is called, 'ioc' and 'karg' as inputs. However, a malicious user can change the 'ioc_number' between the two fetches, which will cause a potential security issues. Moreover, a malicious user can provide a valid 'ioc_number' to pass the check in first fetch, and then modify it in the second fetch. To fix this, we need to recheck the 'ioc_number' in the second fetch. Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang Ack-by: Suganath Prabu S --- diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c index b2bb47c..5181c03 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c @@ -2319,6 +2319,10 @@ _ctl_ioctl_main(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg, break; } + if (karg.hdr.ioc_number != ioctl_header.ioc_number) { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) == sizeof(struct mpt3_ioctl_command)) { uarg = arg; ret = _ctl_do_mpt_command(ioc, karg, &uarg->mf);