From: Carmeli Tamir <carmeli.tamir@gmail.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, carmeli.tamir@gmail.com,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] fs/binfmt: Changed order of elf and misc to prevent privilege escalation
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 14:58:15 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190617185815.3949-1-carmeli.tamir@gmail.com> (raw)
The misc format handler is configured to work in many boards
and distributions, exposing a volnurability that enables an
attacker with a temporary root access to configure the system
to gain a hidden persistent root acces. This can be easily
demonstrated using https://github.com/toffan/binfmt_misc .
According to binfmt_misc documentation
(https://lwn.net/Articles/679310/), the handler is used
to execute more binary formats, e.g. execs compiled
for different architectures. After this patch, every
mentioned example in the documentation shall work.
I tested this patch using a "positive example" - running
and ARM executable on an x86 machine using a qemu-arm misc
handler, and a "negative example" of running the demostration
by toffan I mention above. Before the patch both examples
work, and after the patch only the positive example work
where the volnurability is prevented.
Signed-off-by: Carmeli Tamir <carmeli.tamir@gmail.com>
---
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 +-
fs/binfmt_misc.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index d4e11b2e04f6..3a2afe84943c 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -2411,7 +2411,7 @@ static int elf_core_dump(struct coredump_params *cprm)
static int __init init_elf_binfmt(void)
{
- register_binfmt(&elf_format);
+ insert_binfmt(&elf_format);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
index b8e145552ec7..f4a9e1154cae 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int __init init_misc_binfmt(void)
{
int err = register_filesystem(&bm_fs_type);
if (!err)
- insert_binfmt(&misc_format);
+ register_binfmt(&misc_format);
return err;
}
--
2.21.0
next reply other threads:[~2019-06-17 18:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-17 18:58 Carmeli Tamir [this message]
2019-06-24 16:01 ` Tamir Carmeli
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