From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88BABC43613 for ; Fri, 21 Jun 2019 01:20:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16581208CA for ; Fri, 21 Jun 2019 01:20:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="ACSqKMI7" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726482AbfFUBUG (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Jun 2019 21:20:06 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-f201.google.com ([209.85.215.201]:43860 "EHLO mail-pg1-f201.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726420AbfFUBUC (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Jun 2019 21:20:02 -0400 Received: by mail-pg1-f201.google.com with SMTP id p7so2971112pgr.10 for ; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:20:02 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=NgELRMteSmX1KpxuaMDKOBuc0VBFM90Hd4coc/TmqVU=; b=ACSqKMI7rVvJrlydZWykRsEZ0OCQUb++cj7uLN+4lQThNhHP3k3PG9zYi37SyH9Dpn rd2VqHFnVXRkQl9OcOSg70pc13+aZIlScD9U8dcWo2cnsffi9SMnRtCCLkwSJ0mOuUL7 HxS13GpMnI1s5UUVef6KmTow2HmUvlz+z2/jwv6EB2+Vd+0o+rxbiAQ7aKx0ceJZlWUx 08Bf4/6Jk9EOtgPklFeXx8UuKWqzGkRSE0Bi3XuuN4S6b9RjFN4tCcO2oRFCm8p1OFSu JrFkr9Y8BMSFxcV1Zw74qQw28i5Vn+1ZzPo8Kme5IKT7/nwJUbJ5w2XPDlwhLIPqRESj ANTg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=NgELRMteSmX1KpxuaMDKOBuc0VBFM90Hd4coc/TmqVU=; b=Zo1Br3+rl9H+QXxY220oyhFnhRlzPYVCzTohlIm6glAZlXF9lTBLOmxXn+FabZyVJF ync7FOPWlaaHg2E50yGSZrq/z82AamZ+5tZqBfHjpxGUeoHiwyHxQbjSp5HtDZ0V+du7 eC5utB/mKmdRvmH3BuRMhpPDEN/gRUhQHPy5XDU7eVIJ2gljEE8u3caJR8n05uMV7t/D vSFc2fGvU+9E2rtvFFiSSdRCEx34Px7HzuQwsj5ui2atBt1gk+bP1Yr+L8Rt8aEDKhRe svuzPUSh8/HKcn5kEf0OvFVOITsa4JbyqRxMl0DSl+gXYHK83tcnkFKtMu+91mf9HUpL vVvw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAW0kYXcv1dECspyIT3JEqbrJKzaxQcsuXITQ4woF+NtmC5TPZn+ fkD+Q8HIE+JeGDt87vc7AyOA6EhGwzsDEdbJnH+21g== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzIeCMdr3ffaDQRIeVOvllR4sI3try+R35YojEX1TgCv8N6wazXrBjdBnNKX1W9SaKleY/gXbi5H41fVDmPoCOqhA== X-Received: by 2002:a63:5a4b:: with SMTP id k11mr15535306pgm.143.1561080001656; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:20:01 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:19:17 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190621011941.186255-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190621011941.186255-7-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190621011941.186255-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog Subject: [PATCH V33 06/30] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , David Howells , Matthew Garrett , Dave Young , kexec@lists.infradead.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Matthew Garrett The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation. This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a signature on the image to be booted. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Acked-by: Dave Young cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/kexec.c | 7 +++++++ security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 034a8d54687f..2d3c69b9fd04 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_NONE, LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE, LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM, + LOCKDOWN_KEXEC, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, }; diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index 68559808fdfa..040819d7b11b 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -207,6 +207,13 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, if (result < 0) return result; + /* + * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so + * prevent loading in that case + */ + if (security_is_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) + return -EPERM; + /* * Verify we have a legal set of flags * This leaves us room for future extensions. diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index 43a049b3b66a..94af1c3583d8 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", + [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", }; -- 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog