From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [5.2 REGRESSION] Generic vDSO breaks seccomp-enabled userspace on i386
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2019 17:14:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190723151447.GO3419@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <17F255F9-5084-4E30-9AD6-80A4F49BD0D8@amacapital.net>
On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 07:04:46AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
>
> > On Jul 23, 2019, at 2:18 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
> >
> >> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 04:47:36PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>
> >> I don't love this whole concept, but I also don't have a better idea.
> >
> > Are we really talking about changing the kernel because BPF is expecting
> > things? That is, did we just elevate everything BPF can observe to ABI?
> >
>
> No, this isn’t about internals in the kernel mode sense.
*phew*, I was scared for a wee moment.
> It’s about the smallish number of cases where the kernel causes user
> code to do a specific syscall and the user has a policy that doesn’t
> allow that syscall. This is visible to user code via seccomp and
> ptrace.
>
> Yes, it’s obnoxious. Do you have any suggestions?
Not really; I think I just demonstrated I don't fully understand the
problem space here :/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-23 15:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-19 17:03 Sean Christopherson
2019-07-19 17:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-22 17:16 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-22 18:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-22 18:39 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-22 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-22 23:28 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-22 23:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-23 9:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-23 14:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-23 15:14 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2019-07-23 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-23 22:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-23 22:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-23 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-23 23:56 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-26 18:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-07-27 17:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-27 18:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-27 21:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-28 0:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-28 9:57 ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-07-28 10:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-28 15:27 ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-07-28 18:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-28 18:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-28 11:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
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