From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8B04C32751 for ; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 22:16:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAAE92064A for ; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 22:16:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="gMSAts35" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731218AbfGaWQq (ORCPT ); Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:16:46 -0400 Received: from mail-pl1-f201.google.com ([209.85.214.201]:41633 "EHLO mail-pl1-f201.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731205AbfGaWQp (ORCPT ); Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:16:45 -0400 Received: by mail-pl1-f201.google.com with SMTP id i3so38351973plb.8 for ; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 15:16:44 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=I/5rlFVBONd1Ka7/QUlhE63dhV+4TxEgC7HKPRr7Vsc=; b=gMSAts35o/wnPODCro9DydMZX5y7p1KI0EhPMUuNYbyd5Q6Xxxy0tL/90yw+6/qQMj l9giTy0CijDgmA/xNQp8tpz9dJXEq7ZHBw3gHX4fMKITsYLeBVXKVVIfdulVbq3Peg3w 1TyRbM+Rhhp85lz2YXYM+pwcYW01E767r909bQZxS1gcHPQc7p/oodSsz0ThkQlOlKHm ZbG6AATiMeGGcbzOk7aKYt2t/PNN56kMp7qxsWj5tSxTcaZIr/FUg24BjVgqRi3tVaLa ecwG54oEFOZzMaQ088eNT1XtbXcxzLAhwq7fC+roMT/tuZTDal1sDiD3x3VDkDdvwB4A d6Pg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=I/5rlFVBONd1Ka7/QUlhE63dhV+4TxEgC7HKPRr7Vsc=; b=sgCIrlCgEL6gDnjhTZxMy/EKO087V0uKamEfKVxzE4DKnG9zp37q1X0y27G+kxCT4h XSvVaa7pjiyGomIHtDNgsfeLzwBIVqR79HSgrUTzgbh9mct0wvMcQwKmBhPwapYSLmF/ yrN7G+MAufjvhO+gAI5LaCTQR2Z3m4dvkCmycKcLqpKDRs4inuPt/WoJQKPad4myvQyX M0xi3s6VyUUapWO4KdNe/IyoNAxSWNWhAFdXMsykyjSmpjEauNTu3Itk0wvPcYkddd4h 9ors0jg5D+R5mFIrrPyuKT9az0KJ7s8jSfYoqx4cJhhjbY8o0DZJF4ltk5m+bU2KIXE2 /how== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUcqKaR2cZO4OJfeEFoSthOIAZhvEyzuU7wkz80tGsUGzF3gTOK QxLRhD0ioaxwjbQsqvT97EYv+x6gh2vK7+CA46NSeA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyTX+qLDnmSpQam3pjkGQYBiZyG7S1znrHAEzFD0MX+bZTxK74CZsUoHaPZuUmDe6v6/5kjbS4vOej9Zu44WrYy9g== X-Received: by 2002:a63:125c:: with SMTP id 28mr62619278pgs.255.1564611403845; Wed, 31 Jul 2019 15:16:43 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 15:15:55 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190731221617.234725-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190731221617.234725-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190731221617.234725-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog Subject: [PATCH V37 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Dave Young , David Howells , Matthew Garrett , Kees Cook , kexec@lists.infradead.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Kees Cook cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 5ebcd02cbca7..d2f4e706a428 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi; -- 2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog