From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Invalidate fpregs when __fpu_restore_sig() fails
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2019 15:22:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191219142217.axgpqlb7zzluoxnf@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <587463c4e5fa82dff8748e5f753890ac390e993e.camel@intel.com>
On 2019-12-18 12:53:59 [-0800], Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> I could have explained this better, sorry! I will explain the first
> case below; other cases are similar.
>
> In copy_user_to_fpregs_zeroing(), we have:
>
> if (user_xsave()) {
> ...
> if (unlikely(init_bv))
> copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, init_bv);
> return copy_user_to_xregs(buf, xbv);
> ...
> }
>
> The copy_user_to_xregs() may fail, and when that happens, before going to
> the slow path, there is fpregs_unlock() and context switches may happen.
The context switch may only happen after fpregs_unlock().
> However, at this point, fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx has not been changed; it could
> still be another task's FPU.
TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set for the task in __fpu__restore_sig() and its
context (__fpu_invalidate_fpregs_state()) has been invalidated. So the
FPU register may contain another task's content and
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx points to another context.
> For this to happen and to be detected, the user
> stack page needs to be non-present, fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx need to be another task,
> and that other task needs to be able to detect its registers are modified.
> The last factor is not easy to reproduce, and a CET control-protection fault
> helps.
So far everything is legal. However. If there is a context switch before
fpregs_lock() then this is bad before we don't account for that.
So that:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
fpregs_unlock();
return 0;
}
+ fpregs_deactivate(fpu);
fpregs_unlock();
}
@@ -403,6 +404,8 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
}
if (!ret)
fpregs_mark_activate();
+ else
+ fpregs_deactivate(fpu);
fpregs_unlock();
err_out:
Should be enough.
> > Can you tell me which glibc test? I would like to reproduce this.
> >
> > > The introduction of supervisor xstates and CET, while not contributing to
> > > the problem, makes it more detectable. After init_fpstate and the Shadow
> > > Stack pointer have been restored to xregs, the XRSTOR from user stack
> > > fails and fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx is not updated. The task currently owning
> > > fpregs then uses the corrupted Shadow Stack pointer and triggers a control-
> > > protection fault.
> >
> > So I don't need new HW with supervisor and CET? A plain KVM box with
> > SSE2 and so should be enough?
>
> What I do is, clone the whole glibc source, and run mutiple copies of
> "make check". In about 40 minutes or so, there are unexplained seg faults,
> or a few control-protection faults (if you enable CET). Please let me
> know if more clarification is needed.
Okay. Can you please try the above and if not, I try that glibc thing myself.
> Thanks,
> Yu-cheng
Sebastian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-19 14:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-12 21:08 [PATCH v2 0/3] Fix small issues in XSAVES Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-12 21:08 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Fix small issues before adding supervisor xstates Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-20 20:19 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2020-01-06 18:15 ` [tip: x86/fpu] x86/fpu/xstate: Fix small issues tip-bot2 for Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-12 21:08 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Make xfeature_is_supervisor()/xfeature_is_user() return bool Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-20 20:19 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-20 20:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-01-06 18:15 ` [tip: x86/fpu] " tip-bot2 for Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-12 21:08 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Invalidate fpregs when __fpu_restore_sig() fails Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-18 15:54 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-18 20:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-19 14:22 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior [this message]
2019-12-19 16:44 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-19 17:16 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-19 17:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-20 19:59 ` [PATCH] x86/fpu: Deacticate FPU state after failure during state load Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2020-01-07 12:52 ` [tip: x86/fpu] x86/fpu: Deactivate " tip-bot2 for Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2020-01-07 20:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 20:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-01-07 21:11 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2020-01-08 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-01-08 11:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-12-20 20:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu/xstate: Invalidate fpregs when __fpu_restore_sig() fails Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2019-12-20 20:32 ` Yu-cheng Yu
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-12-05 18:26 [PATCH " Yu-cheng Yu
2019-12-07 4:38 ` [PATCH v2 " Yu-cheng Yu
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