From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83B79C2D0EA for ; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 09:13:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F52B2074F for ; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 09:13:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="sfSEXoYh" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727728AbgDHJNq (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Apr 2020 05:13:46 -0400 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org ([198.137.202.133]:48574 "EHLO bombadil.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726632AbgDHJNq (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Apr 2020 05:13:46 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=bombadil.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version :References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=5q1TNgdtG+EvuttG4Krun6x3Mnm4/9W50CZxgMeFbco=; b=sfSEXoYhWdAiMRkFzutN/nydI5 lXnJKrsD1MvF0yqVZcyYTjcBrr5fLjzlHXrX/KYsXez1CmfHn+S1Fn2wK4qQC85Ob8PBiM5E9g2gE xRf/Xw10+9UUCj5HRHvoZ5BFOINk+JSJKkpSGKNvzXiaqUHlgCgm/1lsZzZkJFujhMGEWJzcSKx/d Xau7ZAUqpNIEt1z+eTO2XUetcv5X7/STGIAn9MhqTOQazAY6D+0KSoebouR7w19xcmT9Wb5diG3aP 8szpdIEeniWEXetZFcJbiPBvfpBjivv2oXJA/rhCe1ANAV3VMvpdmkalsV40IV7S2Y63WZZN2pltF 0E0xUE6A==; Received: from j217100.upc-j.chello.nl ([24.132.217.100] helo=noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1jM6lg-0006Ge-7R; Wed, 08 Apr 2020 09:13:08 +0000 Received: from hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net (hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net [192.168.1.225]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 21682304DB2; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 11:13:06 +0200 (CEST) Received: by hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 12B3C2B9C8A02; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 11:13:06 +0200 (CEST) Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2020 11:13:06 +0200 From: Peter Zijlstra To: Jan Kiszka Cc: Steven Rostedt , tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, hch@infradead.org, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, kenny@panix.com, jeyu@kernel.org, rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk, pbonzini@redhat.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com, nadav.amit@gmail.com, thellstrom@vmware.com, tony.luck@intel.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org, David.Laight@aculab.com, dcovelli@vmware.com, mhiramat@kernel.org, Wolfgang Mauerer Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation Message-ID: <20200408091306.GN20760@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> References: <20200407110236.930134290@infradead.org> <20200407111007.429362016@infradead.org> <20200407174824.5e97a597@gandalf.local.home> <137fe245-69f3-080e-5f2b-207cd218f199@siemens.com> <20200408085138.GQ20713@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200408085138.GQ20713@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Apr 08, 2020 at 10:51:38AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Wed, Apr 08, 2020 at 07:58:53AM +0200, Jan Kiszka wrote: > > On 07.04.20 23:48, Steven Rostedt wrote: > > > > Hmm, wont this break jailhouse? > > Breaking it isn't a problem, it's out of tree and it should be fixable. > > > Yes, possibly. We load the hypervisor binary via request_firmware into > > executable memory and then jump into it. So most of the "suspicious" code is > > W.T.H. does the firmware loader have the ability to give executable > memory? We need to kill that too. /me goes find. AFAICT the firmware loader only provides PAGE_KERNEL_RO, so how do you get it executable? I'm thinking the patches Christoph has lined up will take care of this.