From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>,
"Christopher M. Riedl" <cmr@informatik.wtf>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 18/38] powerpc/xmon: Restrict when kernel is locked down
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 16:15:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200605140253.653389136@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200605140252.542768750@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Christopher M. Riedl <cmr@informatik.wtf>
[ Upstream commit 69393cb03ccdf29f3b452d3482ef918469d1c098 ]
Xmon should be either fully or partially disabled depending on the
kernel lockdown state.
Put xmon into read-only mode for lockdown=integrity and prevent user
entry into xmon when lockdown=confidentiality. Xmon checks the lockdown
state on every attempted entry:
(1) during early xmon'ing
(2) when triggered via sysrq
(3) when toggled via debugfs
(4) when triggered via a previously enabled breakpoint
The following lockdown state transitions are handled:
(1) lockdown=none -> lockdown=integrity
set xmon read-only mode
(2) lockdown=none -> lockdown=confidentiality
clear all breakpoints, set xmon read-only mode,
prevent user re-entry into xmon
(3) lockdown=integrity -> lockdown=confidentiality
clear all breakpoints, set xmon read-only mode,
prevent user re-entry into xmon
Suggested-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christopher M. Riedl <cmr@informatik.wtf>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190907061124.1947-3-cmr@informatik.wtf
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
include/linux/security.h | 2 +
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 2 +
3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
index 8057aafd5f5e..6d130c89fbd8 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -187,6 +188,8 @@ static void dump_tlb_44x(void);
static void dump_tlb_book3e(void);
#endif
+static void clear_all_bpt(void);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
#define REG "%.16lx"
#else
@@ -283,10 +286,38 @@ Commands:\n\
" U show uptime information\n"
" ? help\n"
" # n limit output to n lines per page (for dp, dpa, dl)\n"
-" zr reboot\n\
- zh halt\n"
+" zr reboot\n"
+" zh halt\n"
;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static bool xmon_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+ static bool lockdown;
+
+ if (!lockdown) {
+ lockdown = !!security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW);
+ if (lockdown) {
+ printf("xmon: Disabled due to kernel lockdown\n");
+ xmon_is_ro = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!xmon_is_ro) {
+ xmon_is_ro = !!security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR);
+ if (xmon_is_ro)
+ printf("xmon: Read-only due to kernel lockdown\n");
+ }
+
+ return lockdown;
+}
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+static inline bool xmon_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
static struct pt_regs *xmon_regs;
static inline void sync(void)
@@ -438,7 +469,10 @@ static bool wait_for_other_cpus(int ncpus)
return false;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
+#else /* CONFIG_SMP */
+static inline void get_output_lock(void) {}
+static inline void release_output_lock(void) {}
+#endif
static inline int unrecoverable_excp(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
@@ -455,6 +489,7 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
int cmd = 0;
struct bpt *bp;
long recurse_jmp[JMP_BUF_LEN];
+ bool locked_down;
unsigned long offset;
unsigned long flags;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
@@ -465,6 +500,8 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
local_irq_save(flags);
hard_irq_disable();
+ locked_down = xmon_is_locked_down();
+
if (!fromipi) {
tracing_enabled = tracing_is_on();
tracing_off();
@@ -518,7 +555,8 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
if (!fromipi) {
get_output_lock();
- excprint(regs);
+ if (!locked_down)
+ excprint(regs);
if (bp) {
printf("cpu 0x%x stopped at breakpoint 0x%tx (",
cpu, BP_NUM(bp));
@@ -570,10 +608,14 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
}
remove_bpts();
disable_surveillance();
- /* for breakpoint or single step, print the current instr. */
- if (bp || TRAP(regs) == 0xd00)
- ppc_inst_dump(regs->nip, 1, 0);
- printf("enter ? for help\n");
+
+ if (!locked_down) {
+ /* for breakpoint or single step, print curr insn */
+ if (bp || TRAP(regs) == 0xd00)
+ ppc_inst_dump(regs->nip, 1, 0);
+ printf("enter ? for help\n");
+ }
+
mb();
xmon_gate = 1;
barrier();
@@ -597,8 +639,9 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
spin_cpu_relax();
touch_nmi_watchdog();
} else {
- cmd = cmds(regs);
- if (cmd != 0) {
+ if (!locked_down)
+ cmd = cmds(regs);
+ if (locked_down || cmd != 0) {
/* exiting xmon */
insert_bpts();
xmon_gate = 0;
@@ -635,13 +678,16 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
"can't continue\n");
remove_bpts();
disable_surveillance();
- /* for breakpoint or single step, print the current instr. */
- if (bp || TRAP(regs) == 0xd00)
- ppc_inst_dump(regs->nip, 1, 0);
- printf("enter ? for help\n");
+ if (!locked_down) {
+ /* for breakpoint or single step, print current insn */
+ if (bp || TRAP(regs) == 0xd00)
+ ppc_inst_dump(regs->nip, 1, 0);
+ printf("enter ? for help\n");
+ }
}
- cmd = cmds(regs);
+ if (!locked_down)
+ cmd = cmds(regs);
insert_bpts();
in_xmon = 0;
@@ -670,7 +716,10 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
}
}
#endif
- insert_cpu_bpts();
+ if (locked_down)
+ clear_all_bpt();
+ else
+ insert_cpu_bpts();
touch_nmi_watchdog();
local_irq_restore(flags);
@@ -3761,6 +3810,11 @@ static void xmon_init(int enable)
#ifdef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
static void sysrq_handle_xmon(int key)
{
+ if (xmon_is_locked_down()) {
+ clear_all_bpt();
+ xmon_init(0);
+ return;
+ }
/* ensure xmon is enabled */
xmon_init(1);
debugger(get_irq_regs());
@@ -3782,7 +3836,6 @@ static int __init setup_xmon_sysrq(void)
device_initcall(setup_xmon_sysrq);
#endif /* CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ */
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
static void clear_all_bpt(void)
{
int i;
@@ -3800,18 +3853,22 @@ static void clear_all_bpt(void)
iabr = NULL;
dabr.enabled = 0;
}
-
- printf("xmon: All breakpoints cleared\n");
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
static int xmon_dbgfs_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
xmon_on = !!val;
xmon_init(xmon_on);
/* make sure all breakpoints removed when disabling */
- if (!xmon_on)
+ if (!xmon_on) {
clear_all_bpt();
+ get_output_lock();
+ printf("xmon: All breakpoints cleared\n");
+ release_output_lock();
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -3837,7 +3894,11 @@ static int xmon_early __initdata;
static int __init early_parse_xmon(char *p)
{
- if (!p || strncmp(p, "early", 5) == 0) {
+ if (xmon_is_locked_down()) {
+ xmon_init(0);
+ xmon_early = 0;
+ xmon_on = 0;
+ } else if (!p || strncmp(p, "early", 5) == 0) {
/* just "xmon" is equivalent to "xmon=early" */
xmon_init(1);
xmon_early = 1;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9df7547afc0c..fd022768e91d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -117,12 +117,14 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS,
LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE,
LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS,
+ LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
LOCKDOWN_PERF,
LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
+ LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,
LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
};
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 40b790536def..b2f87015d6e9 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -32,12 +32,14 @@ static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
[LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
+ [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
};
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-05 14:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-05 14:14 [PATCH 5.4 00/38] 5.4.45-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 01/38] Revert "cgroup: Add memory barriers to plug cgroup_rstat_updated() race window" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 02/38] mm: Fix mremap not considering huge pmd devmap Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 03/38] HID: sony: Fix for broken buttons on DS3 USB dongles Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 04/38] HID: multitouch: enable multi-input as a quirk for some devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 05/38] HID: i2c-hid: add Schneider SCL142ALM to descriptor override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 06/38] p54usb: add AirVasT USB stick device-id Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 07/38] mt76: mt76x02u: Add support for newer versions of the XBox One wifi adapter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 08/38] kernel/relay.c: handle alloc_percpu returning NULL in relay_open Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 09/38] mmc: fix compilation of user API Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 10/38] media: Revert "staging: imgu: Address a compiler warning on alignment" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 11/38] media: staging: ipu3-imgu: Move alignment attribute to field Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 12/38] scsi: ufs: Release clock if DMA map fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 13/38] net: dsa: mt7530: set CPU port to fallback mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 14/38] airo: Fix read overflows sending packets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 15/38] drm/i915: fix port checks for MST support on gen >= 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.4 16/38] scsi: hisi_sas: Check sas_port before using it Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 17/38] powerpc/powernv: Avoid re-registration of imc debugfs directory Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 19/38] spi: dw: use "smp_mb()" to avoid sending spi data error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 20/38] ASoC: intel - fix the card names Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 21/38] s390/ftrace: save traced function caller Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 22/38] RDMA/qedr: Fix qpids xarray api used Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 23/38] RDMA/qedr: Fix synchronization methods and memory leaks in qedr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 24/38] ARC: Fix ICCM & DCCM runtime size checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 25/38] ARC: [plat-eznps]: Restrict to CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 26/38] evm: Fix RCU list related warnings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 27/38] scsi: pm: Balance pm_only counter of request queue during system resume Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 28/38] i2c: altera: Fix race between xfer_msg and isr thread Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 29/38] io_uring: initialize ctx->sqo_wait earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 30/38] x86/mmiotrace: Use cpumask_available() for cpumask_var_t variables Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 31/38] net: bmac: Fix read of MAC address from ROM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 32/38] drm/edid: Add Oculus Rift S to non-desktop list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 33/38] s390/mm: fix set_huge_pte_at() for empty ptes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 34/38] null_blk: return error for invalid zone size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 35/38] net/ethernet/freescale: rework quiesce/activate for ucc_geth Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 36/38] net: ethernet: stmmac: Enable interface clocks on probe for IPQ806x Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 37/38] selftests: mlxsw: qos_mc_aware: Specify arping timeout as an integer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 14:15 ` [PATCH 5.4 38/38] net: smsc911x: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-05 22:16 ` [PATCH 5.4 00/38] 5.4.45-rc1 review Shuah Khan
2020-06-06 6:22 ` Jon Hunter
2020-06-06 13:33 ` Guenter Roeck
2020-06-06 16:26 ` Naresh Kamboju
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