Re: [PATCH] x86/speculation/srbds: do not try to turn mitigation off when not supported

[Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 10:28:58AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 02:43:13PM -0300, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo wrote:
> > When SRBDS is mitigated by TSX OFF, update_srbds_msr will still read and
> 
> Are you talking about this case in srbds_select_mitigation():
> 
>         if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
>                 srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
> 
> ?
> 

That's the case that it hits, correct.

> and you have a system which:
> 
>          * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
>          * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
> 
> i.e., no SRBDS microcode for it and the fix is to disable TSX?

It was booted without the microcode update. There was microcode available, but
systems may be booted without it, thus causing warnings due to the MSR
read/write.

> 
> If so, I think the right fix should be to do:
> 
> 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
> 		return;
> 
> in update_srbds_msr() with a comment above it explaining why that check
> is being done.

That's exactly the fix in the patch I sent, right? Do you want me to resend
with a comment, then?

Thanks.
Cascardo.

> 
> Hmmm.
> 
> -- 
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.
> 
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette