From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com,
jmattson@google.com
Cc: yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com, Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Subject: [RESEND v13 04/11] KVM: VMX: Configure CET settings upon guest CR0/4 changing
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 11:16:20 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200716031627.11492-5-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200716031627.11492-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
CR4.CET is master control bit for CET function. There're mutual constrains
between CR0.WP and CR4.CET, so need to check the dependent bit while changing
the control registers.
The processor does not allow CR4.CET to be set if CR0.WP = 0,similarly, it does
not allow CR0.WP to be cleared while CR4.CET = 1. In either case, KVM would
inject #GP to guest.
CET state load bit is set/cleared along with CR4.CET bit set/clear.
Note:
SHSTK and IBT features share one control MSR: MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET, which means
it's difficult to hide one feature from another in the case of SHSTK != IBT,
after discussed in community, it's agreed to allow guest control two features
independently as it won't introduce security hole.
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 5 +++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 4bbd8b448d22..dbc87c5997cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
(vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
}
+static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
+{
+ return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE) &&
+ (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+}
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
{
return (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) &&
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index a9f135c52cbc..0089943fbb31 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -2510,7 +2510,8 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS |
VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
- VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL;
+ VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL |
+ VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
&_vmexit_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
@@ -2534,7 +2535,8 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS |
VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL;
+ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL |
+ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
&_vmentry_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
@@ -3133,6 +3135,12 @@ static bool is_cet_state_supported(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 xss_states)
guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)));
}
+static bool is_cet_supported(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return is_cet_state_supported(vcpu, XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER |
+ XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL);
+}
+
int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -3173,6 +3181,10 @@ int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
return 1;
}
+ if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_CET) && (!is_cet_supported(vcpu) ||
+ !(kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & X86_CR0_WP)))
+ return 1;
+
if (vmx->nested.vmxon && !nested_cr4_valid(vcpu, cr4))
return 1;
@@ -3204,6 +3216,20 @@ int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
hw_cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
}
+ if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
+ if ((hw_cr4 & X86_CR4_CET) && is_cet_supported(vcpu)) {
+ vm_entry_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu),
+ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+ vm_exit_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu),
+ VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+ } else {
+ vm_entry_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu),
+ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+ vm_exit_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu),
+ VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+ }
+ }
+
vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, hw_cr4);
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index ea8a9dc9fbad..906e07039d59 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -815,6 +815,9 @@ int kvm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE))
return 1;
+ if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_WP) && kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_CET))
+ return 1;
+
kvm_x86_ops.set_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_PG) {
--
2.17.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-16 3:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-16 3:16 [RESEND PATCH v13 00/11] Introduce support for guest CET feature Yang Weijiang
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 01/11] KVM: x86: Include CET definitions for KVM test purpose Yang Weijiang
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 02/11] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and flags Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 19:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 03/11] KVM: VMX: Set guest CET MSRs per KVM and host configuration Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 20:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2020-07-22 20:31 ` [RESEND v13 04/11] KVM: VMX: Configure CET settings upon guest CR0/4 changing Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 05/11] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID once guest changes XSS bits Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 20:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 06/11] KVM: x86: Load guest fpu state when access MSRs managed by XSAVES Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 20:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 07/11] KVM: x86: Add userspace access interface for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 20:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 08/11] KVM: VMX: Enable CET support for nested VM Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 21:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 09/11] KVM: VMX: Add VMCS dump and sanity check for CET states Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 21:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 10/11] KVM: x86: Add #CP support in guest exception dispatch Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 21:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-16 3:16 ` [RESEND v13 11/11] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization and advertise CET to userspace Yang Weijiang
2020-07-22 21:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-22 19:48 ` [RESEND PATCH v13 00/11] Introduce support for guest CET feature Sean Christopherson
2020-07-23 3:17 ` Yang Weijiang
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200716031627.11492-5-weijiang.yang@intel.com \
--to=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
--cc=jmattson@google.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
Powered by JetHome