From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"David P . Reed" <dpreed@deepplum.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 16:26:55 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201231002702.2223707-3-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201231002702.2223707-1-seanjc@google.com>
Force all CPUs to do VMXOFF (via NMI shootdown) during an emergency
reboot if VMX is _supported_, as VMX being off on the current CPU does
not prevent other CPUs from being in VMX root (post-VMXON). This fixes
a bug where a crash/panic reboot could leave other CPUs in VMX root and
prevent them from being woken via INIT-SIPI-SIPI in the new kernel.
Fixes: d176720d34c7 ("x86: disable VMX on all CPUs on reboot")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David P. Reed <dpreed@deepplum.com>
[sean: reworked changelog and further tweaked comment]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 30 ++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index db115943e8bd..efbaef8b4de9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -538,31 +538,21 @@ static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void)
local_irq_disable();
/*
- * We need to disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise
- * we risk hanging up the machine, because the CPU ignores INIT
- * signals when VMX is enabled.
+ * Disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise we risk hanging
+ * the machine, because the CPU blocks INIT when it's in VMX root.
*
- * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent
- * state, so we use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to disable
- * VMX and halt.
+ * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent state, so
+ * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to exit VMX root and halt.
*
- * For safety, we will avoid running the nmi_shootdown_cpus()
- * stuff unnecessarily, but we don't have a way to check
- * if other CPUs have VMX enabled. So we will call it only if the
- * CPU we are running on has VMX enabled.
- *
- * We will miss cases where VMX is not enabled on all CPUs. This
- * shouldn't do much harm because KVM always enable VMX on all
- * CPUs anyway. But we can miss it on the small window where KVM
- * is still enabling VMX.
+ * Do the NMI shootdown even if VMX if off on _this_ CPU, as that
+ * doesn't prevent a different CPU from being in VMX root operation.
*/
- if (cpu_has_vmx() && cpu_vmx_enabled()) {
- /* Disable VMX on this CPU. */
- cpu_vmxoff();
+ if (cpu_has_vmx()) {
+ /* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX root operation. */
+ __cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
- /* Halt and disable VMX on the other CPUs */
+ /* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */
nmi_shootdown_cpus(vmxoff_nmi);
-
}
}
--
2.29.2.729.g45daf8777d-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-31 0:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-12-31 0:26 [PATCH 0/9] x86/virt: KVM: x86: Exception handling fixes/cleanups Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31 0:26 ` [PATCH 1/9] x86/virt: Eat faults on VMXOFF in reboot flows Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31 0:26 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2020-12-31 0:26 ` [PATCH 3/9] x86/virt: Mark flags and memory as clobbered by VMXOFF Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31 0:26 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM/nVMX: Use __vmx_vcpu_run in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31 0:26 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: VMX: Move Intel PT shenanigans out of VMXON/VMXOFF flows Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31 0:26 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: VMX: Use the kernel's version of VMXOFF Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31 0:27 ` [PATCH 7/9] KVM: SVM: Use asm goto to handle unexpected #UD on SVM instructions Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31 0:27 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: x86: Kill off __ex() and __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31 0:27 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: x86: Move declaration of kvm_spurious_fault() to x86.h Sean Christopherson
2021-01-27 17:26 ` [PATCH 0/9] x86/virt: KVM: x86: Exception handling fixes/cleanups Paolo Bonzini
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