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From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	willy@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, roman.fietze@magna.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, john.ogness@linutronix.de,
	akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 15:54:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210204155423.2864bf4f@gandalf.local.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210204204835.GA7529@amd>

On Thu, 4 Feb 2021 21:48:35 +0100
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote:

> > +	pr_warn("** Kernel memory addresses are exposed, which may       **\n");
> > +	pr_warn("** compromise security on your system.                  **\n");  
> 
> This is lies, right? And way too verbose.

Not really. More of an exaggeration than a lie. And the verbosity is to
make sure it's noticed by those that shouldn't have it set. This works well
for keeping trace_printk() out of production kernels. Why do you care
anyway, you are just debugging it, and it shouldn't trigger any bug reports
on testing infrastructure. That's why I like the notice. It gets the job
done of keeping people from using things they shouldn't be using, and
doesn't cause testing failures that a WARN_ON would.

-- Steve

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-04 20:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-02 20:18 Timur Tabi
2021-02-02 21:52 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-02 22:19   ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-02 22:34     ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-02 22:51       ` Linus Torvalds
2021-02-03 18:53         ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 20:48 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 20:54   ` Steven Rostedt [this message]
2021-02-04 21:49     ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 21:59       ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-04 22:06         ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-04 22:11         ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:17           ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 22:20             ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-04 22:51             ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:57               ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:05       ` Steven Rostedt

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