From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>, lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [GIT PULL] x86/urgent for v5.12-rc3
Date: Sun, 14 Mar 2021 13:07:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210314120726.GA27191@zn.tnic> (raw)
Hi Linus,
please pull the accumulated x86/urgent pile for v5.12-rc3.
Thx.
---
The following changes since commit a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15:
Linux 5.12-rc2 (2021-03-05 17:33:41 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git tags/x86_urgent_for_v5.12_rc3
for you to fetch changes up to bffe30dd9f1f3b2608a87ac909a224d6be472485:
x86/sev-es: Use __copy_from_user_inatomic() (2021-03-09 12:37:54 +0100)
----------------------------------------------------------------
- A couple of SEV-ES fixes and robustifications: verify usermode stack
pointer in NMI is not coming from the syscall gap, correctly track IRQ
states in the #VC handler and access user insn bytes atomically in same
handler as latter cannot sleep.
- Balance 32-bit fast syscall exit path to do the proper work on exit
and thus not confuse audit and ptrace frameworks.
- Two fixes for the ORC unwinder going "off the rails" into KASAN
redzones and when ORC data is missing.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Lutomirski (1):
x86/entry: Fix entry/exit mismatch on failed fast 32-bit syscalls
Joerg Roedel (4):
x86/sev-es: Introduce ip_within_syscall_gap() helper
x86/sev-es: Check regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack
x86/sev-es: Correctly track IRQ states in runtime #VC handler
x86/sev-es: Use __copy_from_user_inatomic()
Josh Poimboeuf (2):
x86/unwind/orc: Disable KASAN checking in the ORC unwinder, part 2
x86/unwind/orc: Silence warnings caused by missing ORC data
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 15 +++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 22 +++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 14 ++++-----
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
9 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
next reply other threads:[~2021-03-14 12:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-14 12:07 Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-03-14 20:01 ` pr-tracker-bot
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