From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9.y] KVM: nSVM: avoid picking up unsupported bits from L2 in int_ctl (CVE-2021-3653)
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2021 16:02:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210816140240.11399-4-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
[ upstream commit 0f923e07124df069ba68d8bb12324398f4b6b709 ]
* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control
* Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr
This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with
AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled
AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets.
Fixes: 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
The above upstream SHA1 is still on its way to Linus
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 6 +++++-
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 14824fc78f7e..509b9f3307e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
#define V_IGN_TPR_SHIFT 20
#define V_IGN_TPR_MASK (1 << V_IGN_TPR_SHIFT)
+#define V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK (V_IRQ_MASK | V_INTR_PRIO_MASK | V_IGN_TPR_MASK)
+
#define V_INTR_MASKING_SHIFT 24
#define V_INTR_MASKING_MASK (1 << V_INTR_MASKING_SHIFT)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index cbc7f177bbd8..03fdeab057d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -3048,7 +3048,11 @@ static bool nested_svm_vmrun(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm->nested.intercept = nested_vmcb->control.intercept;
svm_flush_tlb(&svm->vcpu);
- svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl = nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl | V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl = nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl &
+ (V_TPR_MASK | V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK);
+
+ svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
+
if (nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK)
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags |= HF_VINTR_MASK;
else
--
2.26.3
reply other threads:[~2021-08-16 14:02 UTC|newest]
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