From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] KVM: x86: Pass emulation type to can_emulate_instruction()
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 01:07:15 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220120010719.711476-6-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220120010719.711476-1-seanjc@google.com>
Pass the emulation type to kvm_x86_ops.can_emulate_insutrction() so that
a future commit can harden KVM's SEV support to WARN on emulation
scenarios that should never happen.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 ++++---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 682ad02a4e58..c890931c9c65 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1482,7 +1482,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*get_msr_feature)(struct kvm_msr_entry *entry);
- bool (*can_emulate_instruction)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *insn, int insn_len);
+ bool (*can_emulate_instruction)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len);
bool (*apic_init_signal_blocked)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*enable_direct_tlbflush)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index edea52be6c01..994224ae2731 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4257,7 +4257,8 @@ static void svm_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
-static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *insn, int insn_len)
+static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len)
{
bool smep, smap, is_user;
unsigned long cr4;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index a02a28ce7cc3..4b4c1dfa6842 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1487,11 +1487,12 @@ static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
return 0;
}
-static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *insn, int insn_len)
+static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len)
{
/*
* Emulation of instructions in SGX enclaves is impossible as RIP does
- * not point tthe failing instruction, and even if it did, the code
+ * not point at the failing instruction, and even if it did, the code
* stream is inaccessible. Inject #UD instead of exiting to userspace
* so that guest userspace can't DoS the guest simply by triggering
* emulation (enclaves are CPL3 only).
@@ -5397,7 +5398,7 @@ static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
gpa_t gpa;
- if (!vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, NULL, 0))
+ if (!vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_PF, NULL, 0))
return 1;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 55518b7d3b96..2fa4687de8e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -6810,6 +6810,13 @@ int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, void *val,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_guest_virt_system);
+static int kvm_can_emulate_insn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len)
+{
+ return static_call(kvm_x86_can_emulate_instruction)(vcpu, emul_type,
+ insn, insn_len);
+}
+
int handle_ud(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
static const char kvm_emulate_prefix[] = { __KVM_EMULATE_PREFIX };
@@ -6817,7 +6824,7 @@ int handle_ud(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
char sig[5]; /* ud2; .ascii "kvm" */
struct x86_exception e;
- if (unlikely(!static_call(kvm_x86_can_emulate_instruction)(vcpu, NULL, 0)))
+ if (unlikely(!kvm_can_emulate_insn(vcpu, emul_type, NULL, 0)))
return 1;
if (force_emulation_prefix &&
@@ -8193,7 +8200,7 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
bool writeback = true;
bool write_fault_to_spt;
- if (unlikely(!static_call(kvm_x86_can_emulate_instruction)(vcpu, insn, insn_len)))
+ if (unlikely(!kvm_can_emulate_insn(vcpu, emulation_type, insn, insn_len)))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
--
2.34.1.703.g22d0c6ccf7-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-20 1:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-20 1:07 [PATCH 0/9] KVM: SVM: Fix and clean up "can emulate" mess Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 1:07 ` [PATCH 1/9] KVM: SVM: Never reject emulation due to SMAP errata for !SEV guests Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 14:16 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 1:07 ` [PATCH 2/9] Revert "KVM: SVM: avoid infinite loop on NPF from bad address" Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 14:17 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 1:07 ` [PATCH 3/9] KVM: SVM: Don't intercept #GP for SEV guests Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 14:30 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 16:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 1:07 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: SVM: Explicitly require DECODEASSISTS to enable SEV support Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 14:32 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 1:07 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-01-20 14:38 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: x86: Pass emulation type to can_emulate_instruction() Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 1:07 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: SVM: WARN if KVM attempts emulation on #UD or #GP for SEV guests Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 15:44 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 17:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-25 14:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-01-20 1:07 ` [PATCH 7/9] KVM: SVM: Inject #UD on attempted emulation for SEV guest w/o insn buffer Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 16:11 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 1:07 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: SVM: Don't apply SEV+SMAP workaround on code fetch or PT access Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 16:37 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 1:07 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: SVM: Don't kill SEV guest if SMAP erratum triggers in usermode Sean Christopherson
2022-01-20 16:46 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-20 16:58 ` [PATCH 0/9] KVM: SVM: Fix and clean up "can emulate" mess Liam Merwick
2022-01-21 8:30 ` Liam Merwick
2022-01-25 14:52 ` Paolo Bonzini
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