From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 864A3C433F5 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 15:07:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1379133AbiBHPHD (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 10:07:03 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56340 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235908AbiBHPHA (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 10:07:00 -0500 Received: from sin.source.kernel.org (sin.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:40e1:4800::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A57CEC061576 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 07:06:59 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by sin.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EE779CE1A7D for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 15:06:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0A754C340F7; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 15:06:55 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="KrCbqWJ2" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1644332814; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=dWd1BpP+gWy6YldHbtkFbasD6YjFmn1T1mSDW8zn5Wg=; b=KrCbqWJ2TIaDff3RPR1pQWOAUnlMm+6KaJ3ReXt3N4832t9hg/TwPafDLydddalxNBumju XotfWayNDW+SZkw6E2Wyn9sxg7ot2GX6nb1OGk/PRJqmrGdo+Z4/vBDZ3VCg1O1iXrLtSk ZagDtInLzkHwzSqhqm7NeWqUh50Bkb8= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 0f56589a (TLSv1.3:AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 15:06:53 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: Linus Torvalds Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [GIT PULL] random number generator fixes for 5.17-rc4 Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 16:06:25 +0100 Message-Id: <20220208150625.374191-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Linus, Please pull the following fixes for 5.17-rc4. This week's pull contains fixes for the crypto ~vuln I mentioned last week. There are extensive details about it and some simple PoC code in the commit message of the first patch if you're curious. Code-wise, the change is both insubstantial and substantial. It is insubstantial in that we're talking about removing over 400 lines of old code, many of which are outdated comments, and replacing them with less than 90 lines, so it's not "big" on the additive side. On the other hand, it is a substantial change, as it's doing away with the heart of our entropy collector that we've had in one form or another forever. It would seem fitting with the times that we're able to replace gobs of old stuff from the 90s with a boring cryptographic hash function. Given that these fixes are for a security issue (albeit a probably relatively low grade one), sending this mid-cycle feels like the "responsible" thing to do, and 5.17 will resultantly have a more secure RNG. However, I also would understand that, diffstat not withstanding, you think this is a bit much and want to reject this pull until 5.18. Either way works for me, though I naturally lean heavily toward the former, hence making this pull request in the first place. Thanks, Jason The following changes since commit dfd42facf1e4ada021b939b4e19c935dcdd55566: Linux 5.17-rc3 (2022-02-06 12:20:50 -0800) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git tags/random-5.17-rc4-for-linus for you to fetch changes up to 966038a49e2b31ff9aa86862295be3915c51dbdd: random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe (2022-02-08 11:53:05 +0100) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Jason A. Donenfeld (5): random: use computational hash for entropy extraction random: simplify entropy debiting random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe drivers/char/random.c | 499 +++++++----------------------------------- include/trace/events/random.h | 30 +-- 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 443 deletions(-)