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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	"Sultan Alsawaf" <sultan@kerneltoast.com>,
	"Jonathan Neuschäfer" <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/2] random: remove batched entropy locking
Date: Wed,  9 Feb 2022 13:56:43 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220209125644.533876-2-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220209125644.533876-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>

Rather than use spinlocks to protect batched entropy, we can instead
disable interrupts locally, since we're dealing with per-cpu data, and
manage resets with a basic generation counter. At the same time, we
can't quite do this on PREEMPT_RT, where we still want spinlocks-as-
mutexes semantics. So we use a local_lock_t, which provides the right
behavior for each. Because this is a per-cpu lock, that generation
counter is still doing the necessary CPU-to-CPU communication.

This should improve performance a bit. It will also fix the linked splat
that Jonathan received with a PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Tested-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YfMa0QgsjCVdRAvJ@latitude/
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 968c415d1f45..ceded1c4f73b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1731,13 +1731,16 @@ static int __init random_sysctls_init(void)
 device_initcall(random_sysctls_init);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
 
+static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
 struct batched_entropy {
 	union {
 		u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
 		u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	};
+	local_lock_t lock;
 	unsigned int position;
-	spinlock_t batch_lock;
+	int generation;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -1749,7 +1752,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
  * point prior.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
-	.batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u64.lock)
 };
 
 u64 get_random_u64(void)
@@ -1758,67 +1761,65 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct batched_entropy *batch;
 	static void *previous;
+	int next_gen;
 
 	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
 
+	local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
 	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
-	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
+
+	next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
+	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0 ||
+	    next_gen != batch->generation) {
 		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
 		batch->position = 0;
+		batch->generation = next_gen;
 	}
+
 	ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+	local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
-	.batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+	.lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u32.lock)
 };
+
 u32 get_random_u32(void)
 {
 	u32 ret;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct batched_entropy *batch;
 	static void *previous;
+	int next_gen;
 
 	warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
 
+	local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
 	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
-	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
+
+	next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
+	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0 ||
+	    next_gen != batch->generation) {
 		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
 		batch->position = 0;
+		batch->generation = next_gen;
 	}
+
 	ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+	local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
 
 /* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
  * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
- * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
- * next usage. */
+ * bumping the generation counter.
+ */
 static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
 {
-	int cpu;
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-		struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
-
-		batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
-		batched_entropy->position = 0;
-		spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
-
-		batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
-		spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
-		batched_entropy->position = 0;
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
-	}
+	atomic_inc(&batch_generation);
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.35.0


  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-09 12:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-09 12:56 [PATCH v4 0/2] random: PREEMPT_RT fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09 12:56 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-02-10 16:24   ` [PATCH v4 1/2] random: remove batched entropy locking Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2022-02-21  2:30   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09 12:56 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-10 18:04   ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2022-02-11  0:42     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-11  1:14       ` [PATCH] random: ensure mix_interrupt_randomness() is consistent Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-11  8:16         ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2022-02-11 10:48           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-11 14:51             ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2022-02-11 16:19               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-11 16:24                 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2022-02-11 13:04           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-11  7:09       ` [PATCH v4 2/2] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2022-02-11  8:25     ` Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-11 14:18       ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior

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