From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: [PATCH] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 22:54:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220209215406.18850-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9pZB1fWf2nZNwTHw07hrnxZYYymA0_Dy=jauDt9TbF69A@mail.gmail.com>
Now that we have an explicit base_crng generation counter, we don't need
a separate one for batched entropy. Rather, we can just move the
generation forward every time we change crng_init state.
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 28 +++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 999f1d164e72..f4d432305869 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -431,8 +431,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
-
/*
* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
@@ -455,7 +453,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
}
if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
+ ++base_crng.generation;
crng_init = 1;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -536,7 +534,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
if (finalize_init) {
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
process_random_ready_list();
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
@@ -1278,7 +1275,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
+ ++base_crng.generation;
crng_init = 2;
pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
}
@@ -1628,8 +1625,6 @@ static int __init random_sysctls_init(void)
device_initcall(random_sysctls_init);
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-
struct batched_entropy {
union {
/* We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the
@@ -1642,8 +1637,8 @@ struct batched_entropy {
u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))];
};
local_lock_t lock;
+ unsigned long generation;
unsigned int position;
- int generation;
};
/*
@@ -1662,14 +1657,14 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
unsigned long flags;
struct batched_entropy *batch;
static void *previous;
- int next_gen;
+ unsigned long next_gen;
warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
- next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
+ next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0 ||
next_gen != batch->generation) {
_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64));
@@ -1695,14 +1690,14 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)
unsigned long flags;
struct batched_entropy *batch;
static void *previous;
- int next_gen;
+ unsigned long next_gen;
warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
- next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
+ next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0 ||
next_gen != batch->generation) {
_get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32));
@@ -1718,15 +1713,6 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
-/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
- * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
- * bumping the generation counter.
- */
-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
-{
- atomic_inc(&batch_generation);
-}
-
/**
* randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
* @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
--
2.35.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-09 21:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-09 18:57 [PATCH] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-09 21:39 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-09 21:54 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-02-10 6:00 ` [PATCH] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-10 13:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-10 13:13 ` [PATCH v2] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21 4:13 ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-21 14:35 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-10 5:43 ` [PATCH] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Dominik Brodowski
2022-02-10 13:07 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-21 4:05 ` Eric Biggers
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220209215406.18850-1-Jason@zx2c4.com \
--to=jason@zx2c4.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux@dominikbrodowski.net \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®