From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88D2BC4332F for ; Mon, 21 Feb 2022 08:06:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346820AbiBUIGU (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Feb 2022 03:06:20 -0500 Received: from mxb-00190b01.gslb.pphosted.com ([23.128.96.19]:33964 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1346808AbiBUIGT (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Feb 2022 03:06:19 -0500 Received: from mga04.intel.com (mga04.intel.com [192.55.52.120]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0262AC67; Mon, 21 Feb 2022 00:05:56 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1645430757; x=1676966757; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=GkbqwLH63vmJ3yZDmeVUzOLZbboEsgFRLd+XjuJr6vU=; b=hrF++hOtsBT8KsQbooaiJeiQ+owH3jQTvhiUDf7iQhPerVqIEWKcB7qh kKwAxJSIGqyC7eM9X4aZLugkLETVmzGWET5ZcDKyVpj3718F54m5I+RdW HjbvSrzZpA3Lf4dy9LvBcwgm3xilQVpifei+QVjUUxOqDkhql0J6dZbA0 H00g1KF8+lIbelHhvmou0vFUVjA8XXTbXu16kZFtQxqQx9MigdOPMKVwg ewgmTzippUBolcYNYScgWkQ48cIAMEe1y43XMm+1KkQtvUfV9hdwF41OM T9pI7MDlHV3gj8MYgBvwxg/trOTcZvOk7yCtYk4zyMj12lkCkRjFqwrLs Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10264"; a="250277836" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,385,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="250277836" Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Feb 2022 00:05:38 -0800 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,385,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="638472221" Received: from unknown (HELO chenyi-pc.sh.intel.com) ([10.239.159.73]) by orsmga004-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Feb 2022 00:05:35 -0800 From: Chenyi Qiang To: Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , Xiaoyao Li Cc: Chenyi Qiang , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 0/7] KVM: PKS Virtualization support Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 16:08:33 +0800 Message-Id: <20220221080840.7369-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patch series is based on top of v8 PKS core support kernel patchset: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127175505.851391-1-ira.weiny@intel.com/ Note: If you read the SDM section 4.6.1 and has some confusion about the statement of Data writes to supervisor-mode address: If CR0.WP = 0, data may be written to any supervisor-mode address with a protection key for which write access is permitted. Which may seems a little conflict with 4.6.2: if WDi = 1, write accesses are not permitted if CR0.WP = 1. (If CR0.WP = 0, IA32_PKRS.WDi does not affect write accesses to supervisor-mode address with protection key i.) In fact, the statement in 4.6.1 doesn't say "a protection key with the appropriate WDi bit set." The reader should instead refer to Section 4.6.2 to find the definition of what that means. We will follow up this with someone internally to make it more clear in SDM. --- Protection Keys for Supervisor Pages(PKS) is a feature that extends the Protection Keys architecture to support thread-specific permission restrictions on supervisor pages. PKS works similar to an existing feature named PKU(protecting user pages). They both perform an additional check after normal paging permission checks are done. Access or Writes can be disabled via a MSR update without TLB flushes when permissions changes. If violating this addional check, #PF occurs and PFEC.PK bit will be set. PKS introduces MSR IA32_PKRS to manage supervisor protection key rights. The MSR contains 16 pairs of ADi and WDi bits. Each pair advertises on a group of pages with the same key which is set in the leaf paging-structure entries(bits[62:59]). Currently, IA32_PKRS is not supported by XSAVES architecture. This patchset aims to add the virtualization of PKS in KVM. It implemented PKS CPUID enumeration, vmentry/vmexit configuration, MSR exposure, nested supported etc. Currently, PKS is not yet supported for shadow paging. Detailed information about PKS can be found in the latest Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual. --- Changelogs: v5->v6 - PKRS is preserved on INIT. Add the PKRS reset operation in kvm_vcpu_reset. (Sean) - Track the pkrs as u32. Add the code WARN on bits 64:32 being set in VMCS field. (Sean) - Adjust the MSR intercept and entry/exit control in VMCS according to guest CPUID. This resolve the issue when userspace re-enable this feature. (Sean) - Split VMX restriction on PKS support(entry/exit load controls) out of common x86. And put tdp restriction together with PKU in common x86. (Sean) - Thanks for Sean to revise the comments in mmu.c related to update_pkr_bitmap, which make it more clear for pkr bitmask cache usage. - v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210811101126.8973-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com/ v4->v5 - Make setting of MSR intercept/vmcs control bits not dependent on guest.CR4.PKS. And set them if PKS is exposed to guest. (Suggested by Sean) - Add pkrs to standard register caching mechanism to help update vcpu->arch.pkrs on demand. Add related helper functions. (Suggested by Sean) - Do the real pkrs update in VMCS field in vmx_vcpu_reset and vmx_sync_vmcs_host_state(). (Sean) - Add a new mmu_role cr4_pks instead of smushing PKU and PKS together. (Sean & Paolo) - v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210205083706.14146-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com/ v3->v4 - Make the MSR intercept and load-controls setting depend on CR4.PKS value - shadow the guest pkrs and make it usable in PKS emultion - add the cr4_pke and cr4_pks check in pkr_mask update - squash PATCH 2 and PATCH 5 to make the dependencies read more clear - v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201105081805.5674-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com/ v2->v3: - No function changes since last submit - rebase on the latest PKS kernel support: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201102205320.1458656-1-ira.weiny@intel.com/ - add MSR_IA32_PKRS to the vmx_possible_passthrough_msrs[] - RFC v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201014021157.18022-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com/ v1->v2: - rebase on the latest PKS kernel support: https://github.com/weiny2/linux-kernel/tree/pks-rfc-v3 - add a kvm-unit-tests for PKS - add the check in kvm_init_msr_list for PKRS - place the X86_CR4_PKS in mmu_role_bits in kvm_set_cr4 - add the support to expose VM_{ENTRY, EXIT}_LOAD_IA32_PKRS in nested VMX MSR - RFC v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200807084841.7112-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com/ --- Chenyi Qiang (7): KVM: VMX: Introduce PKS VMCS fields KVM: VMX: Add proper cache tracking for PKRS KVM: X86: Expose IA32_PKRS MSR KVM: MMU: Rename the pkru to pkr KVM: MMU: Add support for PKS emulation KVM: VMX: Expose PKS to guest KVM: VMX: Enable PKS for nested VM arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 17 ++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 6 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 13 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 7 +++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 27 +++++---- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++------------ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 6 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 38 +++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 7 ++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 +++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 8 +++ arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 6 ++ include/linux/pkeys.h | 6 ++ 17 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1