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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	adrian@parity.io, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, graf@amazon.com,
	colmmacc@amazon.com, raduweis@amazon.com, imammedo@redhat.com,
	ehabkost@redhat.com, ben@skyportsystems.com, mst@redhat.com,
	kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
	sthemmin@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com,
	linux@dominikbrodowski.net, ardb@kernel.org, jannh@google.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tytso@mit.edu
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] random: add mechanism for VM forks to reinitialize crng
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:04:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220223220456.666193-2-Jason@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220223220456.666193-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>

When a VM forks, we must immediately mix in additional information to
the stream of random output so that two forks or a rollback don't
produce the same stream of random numbers, which could have catastrophic
cryptographic consequences. This commit adds a simple API, add_vmfork_
randomness(), for that.

Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c  | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/random.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 536237a0f073..95584f6646f9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -508,6 +508,40 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len,
 	return len;
 }
 
+/*
+ * This mixes unique_vm_id directly into the base_crng key as soon as
+ * possible, similarly to crng_pre_init_inject(), even if the crng is
+ * already running, in order to immediately branch streams from prior
+ * VM instances.
+ */
+static void crng_vmfork_inject(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len)
+{
+	unsigned long flags, next_gen;
+	struct blake2s_state hash;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+
+	/*
+	 * Update the generation, while locked, as early as possible
+	 * This will mean unlocked reads of the generation will
+	 * cause a reseeding of per-cpu crngs, and those will spin
+	 * on the base_crng lock waiting for the rest of this function
+	 * to complete, which achieves the goal of blocking the
+	 * production of new output until this is done.
+	 */
+	next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
+	if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
+		++next_gen;
+	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+
+	blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+	blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+	blake2s_update(&hash, unique_vm_id, len);
+	blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
+
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+}
+
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
@@ -935,6 +969,7 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
  *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
  *					size_t entropy);
  *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
+ *	void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
  *
  * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
@@ -966,6 +1001,11 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
  * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration
  * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
  *
+ * add_vmfork_randomness() adds a unique (but not neccessarily secret) ID
+ * representing the current instance of a VM to the pool, without crediting,
+ * and then immediately mixes that ID into the current base_crng key, so
+ * that it takes effect prior to a reseeding.
+ *
  * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
  * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
  * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
@@ -1195,6 +1235,19 @@ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
 
+/*
+ * Handle a new unique VM ID, which is unique, not secret, so we
+ * don't credit it, but we do mix it into the entropy pool and
+ * inject it into the crng.
+ */
+void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size)
+{
+	add_device_randomness(unique_vm_id, size);
+	if (crng_ready())
+		crng_vmfork_inject(unique_vm_id, size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_vmfork_randomness);
+
 struct fast_pool {
 	union {
 		u32 pool32[4];
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 6148b8d1ccf3..51b8ed797732 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
 extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
 				       size_t entropy);
+extern void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size);
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
-- 
2.35.1


  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-23 22:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-23 22:04 [PATCH v2 0/2] VM fork detection for RNG Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-23 22:04 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-02-23 22:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] virt: vmgenid: introduce driver for reinitializing RNG on VM fork Jason A. Donenfeld

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