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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org
Cc: sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, jgross@suse.com, jmattson@google.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, knsathya@kernel.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, sdeep@vmware.com, seanjc@google.com,
	tony.luck@intel.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv6 17/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add runtime hypercalls
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 05:08:43 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220316020856.24435-18-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220316020856.24435-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>

TDX hypervisors cannot emulate instructions directly. This includes
port I/O which is normally emulated in the hypervisor. All port I/O
instructions inside TDX trigger the #VE exception in the guest and
would be normally emulated there.

Use a hypercall to emulate port I/O. Extend the
tdx_handle_virt_exception() and add support to handle the #VE due to
port I/O instructions.

String I/O operations are not supported in TDX. Unroll them by declaring
CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO confidential computing attribute.

== Userspace Implications ==

The ioperm() facility allows userspace access to I/O instructions like
inb/outb.  Among other things, this allows writing userspace device
drivers.

This series has no special handling for ioperm(). Users will be able to
successfully request I/O permissions but will induce a #VE on their
first I/O instruction which leads SIGSEGV. If this is undesirable users
can enable kernel lockdown feature with 'lockdown=integrity' kernel
command line option. It makes ioperm() fail.

More robust handling of this situation (denying ioperm() in all TDX
guests) will be addressed in follow-on work.

Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/core.c    |  7 +++-
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
index 3f3008783e05..df08edc94f9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
@@ -18,7 +18,12 @@ static u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init;
 
 static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
 {
-	return false;
+	switch (attr) {
+	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index 68da658f563f..3caa5f551d90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@
 #define EPT_READ	0
 #define EPT_WRITE	1
 
+/* Port I/O direction */
+#define PORT_READ	0
+#define PORT_WRITE	1
+
+/* See Exit Qualification for I/O Instructions in VMX documentation */
+#define VE_IS_IO_IN(e)		((e) & BIT(3))
+#define VE_GET_IO_SIZE(e)	(((e) & GENMASK(2, 0)) + 1)
+#define VE_GET_PORT_NUM(e)	((e) >> 16)
+#define VE_IS_IO_STRING(e)	((e) & BIT(4))
+
 /*
  * Wrapper for standard use of __tdx_hypercall with no output aside from
  * return code.
@@ -334,6 +344,73 @@ static bool handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static bool handle_in(struct pt_regs *regs, int size, int port)
+{
+	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = {
+		.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD,
+		.r11 = hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION),
+		.r12 = size,
+		.r13 = PORT_READ,
+		.r14 = port,
+	};
+	bool success;
+	u64 mask = GENMASK(BITS_PER_BYTE * size, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate the I/O read via hypercall. More info about ABI can be found
+	 * in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) section titled
+	 * "TDG.VP.VMCALL<Instruction.IO>".
+	 */
+	success = !__tdx_hypercall(&args, TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT);
+
+	/* Update part of the register affected by the emulated instruction */
+	regs->ax &= ~mask;
+	if (success)
+		regs->ax |= args.r11 & mask;
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+static bool handle_out(struct pt_regs *regs, int size, int port)
+{
+	u64 mask = GENMASK(BITS_PER_BYTE * size, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate the I/O write via hypercall. More info about ABI can be found
+	 * in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) section titled
+	 * "TDG.VP.VMCALL<Instruction.IO>".
+	 */
+	return !_tdx_hypercall(hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION), size,
+			       PORT_WRITE, port, regs->ax & mask);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Emulate I/O using hypercall.
+ *
+ * Assumes the IO instruction was using ax, which is enforced
+ * by the standard io.h macros.
+ *
+ * Return True on success or False on failure.
+ */
+static bool handle_io(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 exit_qual)
+{
+	bool in;
+	int size, port;
+
+	if (VE_IS_IO_STRING(exit_qual))
+		return false;
+
+	in   = VE_IS_IO_IN(exit_qual);
+	size = VE_GET_IO_SIZE(exit_qual);
+	port = VE_GET_PORT_NUM(exit_qual);
+
+
+	if (in)
+		return handle_in(regs, size, port);
+	else
+		return handle_out(regs, size, port);
+}
+
 void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_output out;
@@ -383,6 +460,8 @@ static bool virt_exception_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 		return handle_cpuid(regs);
 	case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
 		return handle_mmio(regs, ve);
+	case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
+		return handle_io(regs, ve->exit_qual);
 	default:
 		pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason);
 		return false;
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-16  2:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-16  2:08 [PATCHv6 00/30] TDX Guest: TDX core support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 01/30] x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 23:10   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 23:33   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 03/30] x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 23:43   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 04/30] x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17  0:01   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 05/30] x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17  0:16   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 13:58     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 14:39       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 06/30] x86/traps: Refactor exc_general_protection() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17  0:21   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 14:05     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 07/30] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17  0:48   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 17:33     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 18:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 20:21       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-03-17 20:32         ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-18 10:55           ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-03-18 13:03             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 14:19         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-18 15:34           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 08/30] x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 09/30] x86/tdx: Add MSR " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 11:30   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 10/30] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 11:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 11/30] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 21:53   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-17 11:48     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 11:35   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 12/30] x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 11:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 18:04     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 13/30] x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 11:56   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 14/30] x86: Consolidate " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 15/30] x86/boot: Port I/O: allow to hook up alternative helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 22:02   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-17 12:12   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 20:10     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 20:20       ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-17 20:23         ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-17 22:48           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 14:20       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 16/30] x86/boot: Port I/O: add decompression-time support for TDX Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 12:15   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 20:15     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 14:28       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-18 15:36         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2022-03-17 12:25   ` [PATCHv6 17/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add runtime hypercalls Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 18/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add early boot support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 19/30] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 20/30] x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 12:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 12:44   ` Boris Petkov
2022-03-17 20:21     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18  9:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 23:47   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-17 12:44   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 22/30] x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 12:46   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 23/30] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 12:48   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 24/30] x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 12:50   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-17 20:47     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 25/30] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 22:06   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-17 14:33   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 26/30] x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 14:56   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 27/30] x86/kvm: Make SWIOTLB buffer shared for TD guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 22:24   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 28/30] x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 15:00   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 29/30] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush inside virtual machines Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-16 22:13   ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-17 15:32     ` Dan Williams
2022-03-17 23:04     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-17 15:23   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-16  2:08 ` [PATCHv6 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture Kirill A. Shutemov

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