From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org
Cc: sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
hpa@zytor.com, jgross@suse.com, jmattson@google.com,
joro@8bytes.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, knsathya@kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, sdeep@vmware.com, seanjc@google.com,
tony.luck@intel.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv7 07/30] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 18:30:25 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220318153048.51177-8-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220318153048.51177-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Virtualization Exceptions (#VE) are delivered to TDX guests due to
specific guest actions which may happen in either user space or the
kernel:
* Specific instructions (WBINVD, for example)
* Specific MSR accesses
* Specific CPUID leaf accesses
* Access to specific guest physical addresses
Syscall entry code has a critical window where the kernel stack is not
yet set up. Any exception in this window leads to hard to debug issues
and can be exploited for privilege escalation. Exceptions in the NMI
entry code also cause issues. Returning from the exception handler with
IRET will re-enable NMIs and nested NMI will corrupt the NMI stack.
For these reasons, the kernel avoids #VEs during the syscall gap and
the NMI entry code. Entry code paths do not access TD-shared memory,
MMIO regions, use #VE triggering MSRs, instructions, or CPUID leaves
that might generate #VE. VMM can remove memory from TD at any point,
but access to unaccepted (or missing) private memory leads to VM
termination, not to #VE.
Similarly to page faults and breakpoints, #VEs are allowed in NMI
handlers once the kernel is ready to deal with nested NMIs.
During #VE delivery, all interrupts, including NMIs, are blocked until
TDGETVEINFO is called. It prevents #VE nesting until the kernel reads
the VE info.
TDGETVEINFO retrieves the #VE info from the TDX module, which also
clears the "#VE valid" flag. This must be done before anything else as
any #VE that occurs while the valid flag is set escalates to #DF by TDX
module. It will result in an oops.
Virtual NMIs are inhibited if the #VE valid flag is set. NMI will not be
delivered until TDGETVEINFO is called.
For now, convert unhandled #VE's (everything, until later in this
series) so that they appear just like a #GP by calling the
ve_raise_fault() directly. The ve_raise_fault() function is similar
to #GP handler and is responsible for sending SIGSEGV to userspace
and CPU die and notifying debuggers and other die chain users.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 38 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 21 ++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 152 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index e84f6dd3ed2a..60a3f2ff5b95 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
/* TDX module Call Leaf IDs */
#define TDX_GET_INFO 1
+#define TDX_GET_VEINFO 3
/*
* Wrapper for standard use of __tdx_hypercall with no output aside from
@@ -73,6 +74,43 @@ static u64 get_cc_mask(void)
return BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
}
+void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve)
+{
+ struct tdx_module_output out;
+
+ /*
+ * Called during #VE handling to retrieve the #VE info from the
+ * TDX module.
+ *
+ * This has to be called early in #VE handling. A "nested" #VE which
+ * occurs before this will raise a #DF and is not recoverable.
+ *
+ * The call retrieves the #VE info from the TDX module, which also
+ * clears the "#VE valid" flag. This must be done before anything else
+ * because any #VE that occurs while the valid flag is set will lead to
+ * #DF.
+ *
+ * Note, the TDX module treats virtual NMIs as inhibited if the #VE
+ * valid flag is set. It means that NMI=>#VE will not result in a #DF.
+ */
+ tdx_module_call(TDX_GET_VEINFO, 0, 0, 0, 0, &out);
+
+ /* Transfer the output parameters */
+ ve->exit_reason = out.rcx;
+ ve->exit_qual = out.rdx;
+ ve->gla = out.r8;
+ ve->gpa = out.r9;
+ ve->instr_len = lower_32_bits(out.r10);
+ ve->instr_info = upper_32_bits(out.r10);
+}
+
+bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
+{
+ pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
void __init tdx_early_init(void)
{
u64 cc_mask;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 1345088e9902..8ccc81d653b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -625,6 +625,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB(X86_TRAP_OTHER, exc_xen_hypervisor_callback);
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_OTHER, exc_xen_unknown_trap);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY(X86_TRAP_VE, exc_virtualization_exception);
+#endif
+
/* Device interrupts common/spurious */
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_IRQ(X86_TRAP_OTHER, common_interrupt);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
index 0fd34019416a..ddbe750861f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/bits.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID 0x21
#define TDX_IDENT "IntelTDX "
@@ -55,6 +56,22 @@ struct tdx_hypercall_args {
u64 r15;
};
+/*
+ * Used by the #VE exception handler to gather the #VE exception
+ * info from the TDX module. This is a software only structure
+ * and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
+ */
+struct ve_info {
+ u64 exit_reason;
+ u64 exit_qual;
+ /* Guest Linear (virtual) Address */
+ u64 gla;
+ /* Guest Physical Address */
+ u64 gpa;
+ u32 instr_len;
+ u32 instr_info;
+};
+
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
void __init tdx_early_init(void);
@@ -69,6 +86,10 @@ u64 __tdx_hypercall(struct tdx_hypercall_args *args, unsigned long flags);
/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
void __tdx_hypercall_failed(void);
+void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve);
+
+bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve);
+
#else
static inline void tdx_early_init(void) { };
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index df0fa695bb09..1da074123c16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data early_idts[] = {
*/
INTG(X86_TRAP_PF, asm_exc_page_fault),
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+ INTG(X86_TRAP_VE, asm_exc_virtualization_exception),
+#endif
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index bb02faf5a50c..a77103e541bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
#include <asm/vdso.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
@@ -1272,6 +1273,91 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_device_not_available)
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+
+#define VE_FAULT_STR "VE fault"
+
+static void ve_raise_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+ if (user_mode(regs)) {
+ gp_user_force_sig_segv(regs, X86_TRAP_VE, error_code, VE_FAULT_STR);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (gp_try_fixup_and_notify(regs, X86_TRAP_VE, error_code, VE_FAULT_STR))
+ return;
+
+ die_addr(VE_FAULT_STR, regs, error_code, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Virtualization Exceptions (#VE) are delivered to TDX guests due to
+ * specific guest actions which may happen in either user space or the
+ * kernel:
+ *
+ * * Specific instructions (WBINVD, for example)
+ * * Specific MSR accesses
+ * * Specific CPUID leaf accesses
+ * * Access to specific guest physical addresses
+ *
+ * In the settings that Linux will run in, virtualization exceptions are
+ * never generated on accesses to normal, TD-private memory that has been
+ * accepted.
+ *
+ * Syscall entry code has a critical window where the kernel stack is not
+ * yet set up. Any exception in this window leads to hard to debug issues
+ * and can be exploited for privilege escalation. Exceptions in the NMI
+ * entry code also cause issues. Returning from the exception handler with
+ * IRET will re-enable NMIs and nested NMI will corrupt the NMI stack.
+ *
+ * For these reasons, the kernel avoids #VEs during the syscall gap and
+ * the NMI entry code. Entry code paths do not access TD-shared memory,
+ * MMIO regions, use #VE triggering MSRs, instructions, or CPUID leaves
+ * that might generate #VE. VMM can remove memory from TD at any point,
+ * but access to unaccepted (or missing) private memory leads to VM
+ * termination, not to #VE.
+ *
+ * Similarly to page faults and breakpoints, #VEs are allowed in NMI
+ * handlers once the kernel is ready to deal with nested NMIs.
+ *
+ * During #VE delivery, all interrupts, including NMIs, are blocked until
+ * TDGETVEINFO is called. It prevents #VE nesting until the kernel reads
+ * the VE info.
+ *
+ * If a guest kernel action which would normally cause a #VE occurs in
+ * the interrupt-disabled region before TDGETVEINFO, a #DF (fault
+ * exception) is delivered to the guest which will result in an oops.
+ *
+ * The entry code has been audited carefully for following these expectations.
+ * Changes in the entry code have to be audited for correctness vs. this
+ * aspect. Similarly to #PF, #VE in these places will expose kernel to
+ * privilege escalation or may lead to random crashes.
+ */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_virtualization_exception)
+{
+ struct ve_info ve;
+
+ /*
+ * NMIs/Machine-checks/Interrupts will be in a disabled state
+ * till TDGETVEINFO TDCALL is executed. This ensures that VE
+ * info cannot be overwritten by a nested #VE.
+ */
+ tdx_get_ve_info(&ve);
+
+ cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+ /*
+ * If tdx_handle_virt_exception() could not process
+ * it successfully, treat it as #GP(0) and handle it.
+ */
+ if (!tdx_handle_virt_exception(regs, &ve))
+ ve_raise_fault(regs, 0);
+
+ cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
+}
+
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SW(iret_error)
{
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-18 15:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-18 15:30 [PATCHv7 00/30] TDX Guest: TDX core support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 01/30] x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-19 14:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-21 15:52 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-21 16:02 ` [PATCHv7.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-04 3:19 ` Kai Huang
2022-04-04 3:25 ` Kai Huang
2022-04-04 13:51 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-04 23:35 ` Kai Huang
2022-04-05 0:01 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-05 0:23 ` Kai Huang
2022-04-08 20:12 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 03/30] x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 04/30] x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 05/30] x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 06/30] x86/traps: Refactor exc_general_protection() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 08/30] x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 09/30] x86/tdx: Add MSR " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 10/30] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 11/30] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 12/30] x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 13/30] x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 14/30] x86: Consolidate " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 15/30] x86/boot: Port I/O: allow to hook up alternative helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 16:04 ` [PATCHv7.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 16/30] x86/boot: Port I/O: add decompression-time support for TDX Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 16:05 ` [PATCHv7.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 17/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add runtime hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 18/30] x86/tdx: Port I/O: add early boot support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 19/30] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 20/30] x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 18:23 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-18 19:22 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-24 15:24 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-28 19:17 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-30 23:16 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-30 23:44 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-31 1:52 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-01 17:33 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 22/30] x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 23/30] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 24/30] x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 25/30] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 26/30] x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 27/30] x86/mm: Make DMA memory shared for TD guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:53 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 28/30] x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 29/30] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush inside virtual machines Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18 15:30 ` [PATCHv7 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-04 4:32 ` Kai Huang
2022-04-04 6:25 ` Dave Hansen
2022-04-04 7:23 ` Kai Huang
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