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From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>, Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	llvm@lists.linux.dev, Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>,
	linux-input@vger.kernel.org,
	Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] Fix FORTIFY=y UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS=y
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2022 13:53:06 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220830205309.312864-1-ndesaulniers@google.com> (raw)

With CONFIG_FORTIFY=y and CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS=y enabled, we
observe a runtime panic while running Android's Compatibility Test
Suite's (CTS) android.hardware.input.cts.tests.  This is stemming from a
strlen() call in hidinput_allocate().

__builtin_object_size(str, 0 or 1) has interesting behavior for C
strings when str is runtime dependent, and all possible values are known
at compile time; it evaluates to the maximum of those sizes. This causes
UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS to insert faults for the smaller values, which we
trip at runtime.

Patch 1 adds a KCONFIG version check for __builtin_dynamic_object_size,
and uses that in __compiletime_strlen rather than __builtin_object_size.
Patch 2 and 3 are cosmetic cleanups, they're not as important to me as
patch 1 is.

Nick Desaulniers (3):
  fortify: use __builtin_dynamic_object_size in __compiletime_strlen
  fortify: cosmetic cleanups to __compiletime_strlen
  HID: avoid runtime call to strlen

 drivers/hid/hid-input.c        | 13 ++++++++++++-
 include/linux/fortify-string.h | 15 ++++++++++-----
 init/Kconfig                   |  3 +++
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

-- 
2.37.2.672.g94769d06f0-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2022-08-30 20:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-30 20:53 Nick Desaulniers [this message]
2022-08-30 20:53 ` [PATCH 1/3] fortify: use __builtin_dynamic_object_size in __compiletime_strlen Nick Desaulniers
2022-08-31 18:34   ` Kees Cook
2022-08-30 20:53 ` [PATCH 2/3] fortify: cosmetic cleanups to __compiletime_strlen Nick Desaulniers
2022-08-31 13:13   ` kernel test robot
2022-08-31 19:06   ` Kees Cook
2022-08-30 20:53 ` [PATCH 3/3] HID: avoid runtime call to strlen Nick Desaulniers
2022-08-31  6:05   ` Greg KH

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