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From: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: corbet@lwn.net, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, rjw@rjwysocki.net,
	gwendal@chromium.org, apronin@chromium.org,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dlunev@google.com,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Ben Boeckel <me@benboeckel.net>,
	jarkko@kernel.org, Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, axelj <axelj@axis.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 06/11] security: keys: trusted: Verify creation data
Date: Thu,  3 Nov 2022 11:01:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221103105558.v4.6.I6cdb522cb5ea28fcd1e35b4cd92cbd067f99269a@changeid> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221103180120.752659-1-evgreen@chromium.org>

If a loaded key contains creation data, ask the TPM to verify that
creation data. This allows users like encrypted hibernate to know that
the loaded and parsed creation data has not been tampered with.

Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>

---
Source material for this change is at:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-pm/patch/20210220013255.1083202-9-matthewgarrett@google.com/

(no changes since v3)

Changes in v3:
 - Changed funky tag to suggested-by (Kees). Matthew, holler if you want
   something different.

Changes in v2:
 - Adjust hash len by 2 due to new ASN.1 storage, and add underflow
   check.

 include/linux/tpm.h                       |  1 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 70134e6551745f..9c2ee3e30ffa5d 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
 	TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST	        = 0x0143,
 	TPM2_CC_STARTUP		        = 0x0144,
 	TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN	        = 0x0145,
+	TPM2_CC_CERTIFYCREATION	        = 0x014A,
 	TPM2_CC_NV_READ                 = 0x014E,
 	TPM2_CC_CREATE		        = 0x0153,
 	TPM2_CC_LOAD		        = 0x0157,
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index a7ad83bc0e5396..c76a1b5a2e8471 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -703,6 +703,74 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * tpm2_certify_creation() - execute a TPM2_CertifyCreation command
+ *
+ * @chip: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @blob_handle: the loaded TPM handle of the key
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success
+ *         -EINVAL on tpm error status
+ *         < 0 error from tpm_send or tpm_buf_init
+ */
+static int tpm2_certify_creation(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+				 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+				 u32 blob_handle)
+{
+	struct tpm_header *head;
+	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CERTIFYCREATION);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Use TPM_RH_NULL for signHandle */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0x40000007);
+
+	/* Object handle */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle);
+
+	/* Auth */
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 9);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+	/* Qualifying data */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+
+	/* Creation data hash */
+	if (payload->creation_hash_len < 2) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->creation_hash_len - 2);
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->creation_hash + 2,
+		       payload->creation_hash_len - 2);
+
+	/* signature scheme */
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+
+	/* creation ticket */
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->tk, payload->tk_len);
+
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "certifying creation data");
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+
+	if (be32_to_cpu(head->return_code) != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+out:
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /**
  * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
  *
@@ -728,8 +796,15 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
-	tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+	if (rc)
+		goto flush;
+
+	if (payload->creation_len)
+		rc = tpm2_certify_creation(chip, payload, blob_handle);
 
+
+flush:
+	tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
 out:
 	tpm_put_ops(chip);
 
-- 
2.38.1.431.g37b22c650d-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-11-03 18:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-03 18:01 [PATCH v4 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] tpm: Export and rename tpm2_find_and_validate_cc() Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:25   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 11:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:27   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 11:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-07 18:15     ` Evan Green
2022-11-11 20:04       ` Evan Green
2022-11-23 23:03       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:33   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 20:11     ` Evan Green
2022-11-10  0:29       ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:34   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-03 18:01 ` Evan Green [this message]
2022-11-04 18:35   ` [PATCH v4 06/11] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Kees Cook
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:38   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10  0:29     ` Evan Green
2022-11-07 11:42   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:41   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-11-04 18:54   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10  0:30     ` Evan Green
2022-11-10 16:17       ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10 18:32         ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-11-04 19:00   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10  0:30     ` Evan Green
2022-11-03 18:01 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green

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