[PATCH v2 2/7] x86/boot: Delay sev_verify_cbit() a bit

[Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>]

Per the comment it is important to call sev_verify_cbit() before the
first RET instruction, this means we can delay calling this until more
of the CPU state is set up, specifically delay this until GS is
'sane' such that per-cpu variables work.

Fixes: e81dc127ef69 ("x86/callthunks: Add call patching for call depth tracking")
Reported-by: Joan Bruguera <joanbrugueram@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |   26 +++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -185,19 +185,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
 	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rax
 
 	/*
-	 * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
-	 * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
-	 * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
-	 * the next RET instruction.
-	 * %rsi carries pointer to realmode data and is callee-clobbered. Save
-	 * and restore it.
-	 */
-	pushq	%rsi
-	movq	%rax, %rdi
-	call	sev_verify_cbit
-	popq	%rsi
-
-	/*
 	 * Switch to new page-table
 	 *
 	 * For the boot CPU this switches to early_top_pgt which still has the
@@ -265,6 +252,19 @@ SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
 	 */
 	movq initial_stack(%rip), %rsp
 
+	/*
+	 * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
+	 * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
+	 * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
+	 * the next RET instruction.
+	 * %rsi carries pointer to realmode data and is callee-clobbered. Save
+	 * and restore it.
+	 */
+	pushq	%rsi
+	movq	%rax, %rdi
+	call	sev_verify_cbit
+	popq	%rsi
+
 	/* Setup and Load IDT */
 	pushq	%rsi
 	call	early_setup_idt