From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Subject: [PATCH for-5.15 2/3] KVM: x86: Mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions bug
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 12:09:55 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230214170956.1297309-3-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230214170956.1297309-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
By default, KVM/SVM will intercept attempts by the guest to transition
out of C0. However, the KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS capability can be used
by a VMM to change this behavior. To mitigate the cross-thread return
address predictions bug (X86_BUG_SMT_RSB), a VMM must not be allowed to
override the default behavior to intercept C0 transitions.
Use a module parameter to control the mitigation on processors that are
vulnerable to X86_BUG_SMT_RSB. If the processor is vulnerable to the
X86_BUG_SMT_RSB bug and the module parameter is set to mitigate the bug,
KVM will not allow the disabling of the HLT, MWAIT and CSTATE exits.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <4019348b5e07148eb4d593380a5f6713b93c9a16.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index fcfa3fedf84f..45a3d11bb70d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -184,6 +184,10 @@ module_param(force_emulation_prefix, bool, S_IRUGO);
int __read_mostly pi_inject_timer = -1;
module_param(pi_inject_timer, bint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+/* Enable/disable SMT_RSB bug mitigation */
+bool __read_mostly mitigate_smt_rsb;
+module_param(mitigate_smt_rsb, bool, 0444);
+
/*
* Restoring the host value for MSRs that are only consumed when running in
* usermode, e.g. SYSCALL MSRs and TSC_AUX, can be deferred until the CPU
@@ -4164,10 +4168,15 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
r = KVM_CLOCK_TSC_STABLE;
break;
case KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS:
- r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT | KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE |
- KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE;
- if(kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
- r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT;
+ r = KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE;
+
+ if (!mitigate_smt_rsb) {
+ r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT |
+ KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE;
+
+ if (kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
+ r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT;
+ }
break;
case KVM_CAP_X86_SMM:
/* SMBASE is usually relocated above 1M on modern chipsets,
@@ -5746,15 +5755,26 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_DISABLE_VALID_EXITS)
break;
- if ((cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT) &&
- kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
- kvm->arch.mwait_in_guest = true;
- if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT)
- kvm->arch.hlt_in_guest = true;
if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE)
kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
- if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE)
- kvm->arch.cstate_in_guest = true;
+
+#define SMT_RSB_MSG "This processor is affected by the Cross-Thread Return Predictions vulnerability. " \
+ "KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS should only be used with SMT disabled or trusted guests."
+
+ if (!mitigate_smt_rsb) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB) && cpu_smt_possible() &&
+ (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE))
+ pr_warn_once(SMT_RSB_MSG);
+
+ if ((cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT) &&
+ kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
+ kvm->arch.mwait_in_guest = true;
+ if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT)
+ kvm->arch.hlt_in_guest = true;
+ if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE)
+ kvm->arch.cstate_in_guest = true;
+ }
+
r = 0;
break;
case KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
@@ -12796,6 +12816,7 @@ EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit);
static int __init kvm_x86_init(void)
{
kvm_mmu_x86_module_init();
+ mitigate_smt_rsb &= boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB) && cpu_smt_possible();
return 0;
}
module_init(kvm_x86_init);
--
2.39.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-14 17:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-14 17:09 [PATCH for-5.15 0/3] Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions vulnerability Paolo Bonzini
2023-02-14 17:09 ` [PATCH for-5.15 1/3] x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions Paolo Bonzini
2023-02-14 17:09 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2023-02-14 17:09 ` [PATCH for-5.15 3/3] Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for Cross-Thread Return Predictions Paolo Bonzini
2023-02-14 18:06 ` [PATCH for-5.15 0/3] Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions vulnerability Greg KH
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