mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pjt@google.com, evn@google.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com,
	kim.phillips@amd.com, alexandre.chartre@oracle.com,
	daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
	"José Oliveira" <joseloliveira11@gmail.com>,
	"Rodrigo Branco" <rodrigo@kernelhacking.com>,
	"Alexandra Sandulescu" <aesa@google.com>,
	"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] x86/speculation: Fix user-mode spectre-v2 protection with KERNEL_IBRS
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2023 04:13:50 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230220121350.aidsipw3kd4rsyss@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org>

On Mon, Feb 20, 2023 at 01:01:27PM +0100, KP Singh wrote:
> +static inline bool spectre_v2_user_no_stibp(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
> +{
> +	/* When IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, STIBP is not needed.
> +	 *
> +	 * However, With KERNEL_IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on return
> +	 * to user and the user-mode code needs to be able to enable protection
> +	 * from cross-thread training, either by always enabling STIBP or
> +	 * by enabling it via prctl.
> +	 */
> +	return (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode) &&
> +		!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS));
> +}

The comments and code confused me, they both seem to imply some
distinction between IBRS and KERNEL_IBRS, but in the kernel those are
functionally the same thing.  e.g., the kernel doesn't have a user IBRS
mode.

And, unless I'm missing some subtlety here, it seems to be a convoluted
way of saying that eIBRS doesn't need STIBP in user space.

It would be simpler to just call it spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode().

static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
	return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}

And then spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() could be changed to call that:

static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
	return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
}

> @@ -1496,6 +1504,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>  		break;
>  
>  	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
> +		pr_err("enabling KERNEL_IBRS");

Why?

> @@ -2327,7 +2336,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
>  
>  static char *stibp_state(void)
>  {
> -	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
> +	if (spectre_v2_user_no_stibp(spectre_v2_enabled))
>  		return "";

This seems like old cruft, can we just remove this check altogether?  In
the eIBRS case, spectre_v2_user_stibp will already have its default of
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE.

-- 
Josh

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-20 12:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-20 12:01 KP Singh
2023-02-20 12:13 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2023-02-20 12:20   ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 12:34     ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 14:31       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 15:38         ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-20 19:57         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-02-20 21:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 23:01             ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 23:30             ` Andrew Cooper
2023-02-20 23:45               ` KP Singh
2023-02-21 18:52                 ` KP Singh
2023-02-21 10:59               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 16:34       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 17:46         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 17:59           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 18:01             ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 18:22               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 18:44                 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 18:51                   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 18:56                     ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 19:02                       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 19:10                         ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 18:27               ` [PATCH] x86/bugs: Allow STIBP with IBRS Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 18:33                 ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 18:59                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 19:04                     ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 19:19                       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 18:34                 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-20 19:09                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 19:16                     ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 19:35                       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-02-20 19:38                         ` KP Singh
2023-02-20 19:20                     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-22  1:20                     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-02-22  1:26                       ` KP Singh
2023-02-22  1:38                         ` Pawan Gupta
2023-02-27 19:59 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS tip-bot2 for KP Singh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20230220121350.aidsipw3kd4rsyss@treble \
    --to=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
    --cc=aesa@google.com \
    --cc=alexandre.chartre@oracle.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=evn@google.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=joseloliveira11@gmail.com \
    --cc=kim.phillips@amd.com \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=pjt@google.com \
    --cc=rodrigo@kernelhacking.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®