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From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] selinux: clean up dead code after removing runtime disable
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 10:21:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230324092114.13907-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> (raw)

Commit f22f9aaf6c3d ("selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality")
removes the config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE. This results in some dead code
in lsm_hooks.h.

Remove this dead code.

Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 23 -----------------------
 1 file changed, 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 2b04f94a31bd..ab2b2fafa4a4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -117,29 +117,6 @@ extern struct lsm_info __start_early_lsm_info[], __end_early_lsm_info[];
 		__used __section(".early_lsm_info.init")		\
 		__aligned(sizeof(unsigned long))
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
-/*
- * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to
- * the security module involved. This may entail ordering the
- * module's hook list in a particular way, refusing to disable
- * the module once a policy is loaded or any number of other
- * actions better imagined than described.
- *
- * The name of the configuration option reflects the only module
- * that currently uses the mechanism. Any developer who thinks
- * disabling their module is a good idea needs to be at least as
- * careful as the SELinux team.
- */
-static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
-						int count)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
-		hlist_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list);
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
-
 extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
-- 
2.17.1


             reply	other threads:[~2023-03-24  9:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-03-24  9:21 Lukas Bulwahn [this message]
2023-03-24 20:20 ` Paul Moore

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