From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C74BC7EE2C for ; Tue, 6 Jun 2023 00:36:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233545AbjFFAgq (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Jun 2023 20:36:46 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41080 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229667AbjFFAgn (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Jun 2023 20:36:43 -0400 Received: from mail-pl1-x633.google.com (mail-pl1-x633.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::633]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F3E9DA6; Mon, 5 Jun 2023 17:36:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pl1-x633.google.com with SMTP id d9443c01a7336-1b04949e5baso48296725ad.0; Mon, 05 Jun 2023 17:36:42 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20221208; t=1686011802; x=1688603802; h=in-reply-to:content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id :subject:cc:to:from:date:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=aVI8dupNDIedITeiCx39tP+I11M/SZEr3MwrAYz+yzY=; b=dGNYNid0Wp6HFqQolAlALyvrQjYSyEU74cpb8cZyb/Bt0ora6LnGhKCRaJD2qlFjkm IM9pT3MOqr2irJXnGCNRNYa7R+J/3xcu2HQkHCH4jO+HsZlEJbSbiG5zddQiLXHxuI+E +TFSVjXCOYu1rugAS4opQ2Bca+APv/6ouIWRHb+MgHgRJv513VyuYmu6Ij1Rs93c5Lt3 OJC0OUgsZSsBysIOnJ0luLzOJ0qJHRfC5VDyPrmH5rp7SduRFHsq4dLJD968tJOD8JSP VpWcyDONmujSZdnsKJBwP8W2eXtB7jeMwAhQuQRTn1YRi4MrxvgHFASkUL0OE++n0Lfx 2J4A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1686011802; x=1688603802; h=in-reply-to:content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id :subject:cc:to:from:date:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=aVI8dupNDIedITeiCx39tP+I11M/SZEr3MwrAYz+yzY=; b=CQ+IqrVQbqylqpYgP0Ot18A2UE4mfJyKMcJw2B32u0+AGEWZebMJTkh4/qFjKpKnLi gE3SOCEkDEwue3zC+uLIsSjhCuDBqFG1DnJLEtDW4+7lBTOq5e1334gwtFCjpleVRXFI zi3b9vnVVX6tFyQfcTVCBqd/89qqDq6MYAmRG/iySXHlxFRiPMs7+wWz02d7u2cQ+gjX 8uVQ8JzalT+43HYyPZ3u6HsoW7+K1CAjYDNyvNr6F+2Dq59bLUQO5fbWG9tcFwWlASUB vj1XbQC1t07EshEs1+m2RqdluInkn6TXBtDspAWsAqGtQ6l4M/wDmd1c3yRt8+cS87HU yaAQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AC+VfDxbEoy0KbI+3E+NJv01inxKo1Ykzmnijc+LpSTSYhktLGc9KAqE OEY8pb0Lw+9fGP0PrnW0C70= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACHHUZ47A9aim+b5IhNEHoXo9V1kV7FAiSwO+95+hBWVTQOnbkM9oW1ZP/zYMjIZhQicjTxf2tb08Q== X-Received: by 2002:a17:903:44b:b0:1a9:b0a3:f03a with SMTP id iw11-20020a170903044b00b001a9b0a3f03amr581108plb.9.1686011802165; Mon, 05 Jun 2023 17:36:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([192.55.54.50]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id x16-20020a1709027c1000b001b04b1bd774sm7140433pll.208.2023.06.05.17.36.40 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 05 Jun 2023 17:36:41 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 17:36:39 -0700 From: Isaku Yamahata To: Kai Huang Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com, peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, david@redhat.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com, ying.huang@intel.com, reinette.chatre@intel.com, len.brown@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com, chao.gao@intel.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, bagasdotme@gmail.com, sagis@google.com, imammedo@redhat.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] TDX host kernel support Message-ID: <20230606003639.GB2244082@ls.amr.corp.intel.com> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Jun 05, 2023 at 02:27:13AM +1200, Kai Huang wrote: > Intel Trusted Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious > host and certain physical attacks. TDX specs are available in [1]. > > This series is the initial support to enable TDX with minimal code to > allow KVM to create and run TDX guests. KVM support for TDX is being > developed separately[2]. A new "userspace inaccessible memfd" approach > to support TDX private memory is also being developed[3]. The KVM will > only support the new "userspace inaccessible memfd" as TDX guest memory. > > This series doesn't aim to support all functionalities, and doesn't aim > to resolve all things perfectly. All other optimizations will be posted > as follow-up once this initial TDX support is upstreamed. > > Also, the patch to add the new kernel comline tdx="force" isn't included > in this initial version, as Dave suggested it isn't mandatory. But I > will add one once this initial version gets merged. > > (For memory hotplug, sorry for broadcasting widely but I cc'ed the > linux-mm@kvack.org following Kirill's suggestion so MM experts can also > help to provide comments.) > > Hi Dave, Kirill, Tony, Peter, Thomas, Dan (and Intel reviewers), > > The new relaxed TDX per-cpu initialization flow has been verified. The > TDX module can be initialized when there are offline cpus, and the > TDH.SYS.LP.INIT SEAMCALL can be made successfully later after module > initialization when the offline cpu is up. > > This series mainly added code to handle the new TDX "partial write > machine check" erratum (SPR113) in [4]. > > And I would appreciate reviewed-by or acked-by tags if the patches look > good to you. Thanks in advance! I've rebased the TDX KVM patch series v14 [1] with this patch series and uploaded it at [2]. As the rebased TDX KVM patches doesn't have any changes except trivial rebase fixes, I don't post something like v14.1. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1685333727.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com/ [2] https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream-workaround -- Isaku Yamahata