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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>,
	luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	jgross@suse.com, tiala@microsoft.com, kirill@shutemov.name,
	jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
	srutherford@google.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	anshuman.khandual@arm.com, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com,
	adrian.hunter@intel.com, daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
	alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, sandipan.das@amd.com,
	ray.huang@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
	venu.busireddy@oracle.com, sterritt@google.com,
	tony.luck@intel.com, samitolvanen@google.com,
	fenghua.yu@intel.com, pangupta@amd.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 09:50:26 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230606075026.GA905437@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54fa0a4f-9b3e-50d7-57cb-e0d2d39b7761@amd.com>

On Tue, Jun 06, 2023 at 08:00:32AM +0200, Gupta, Pankaj wrote:
> 
> > > That should really say that a nested #HV should never be raised by the
> > > hypervisor, but if it is, then the guest should detect that and
> > > self-terminate knowing that the hypervisor is possibly being malicious.
> > 
> > I've yet to see code that can do that reliably.
> 
> - Currently, we are detecting the direct nested #HV with below check and
>   guest self terminate.
> 
>   <snip>
> 	if (get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info) &&
> 	    (info.type == (STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + ESTACK_HV) ||
> 	     info.type == (STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + ESTACK_HV2)))
> 		panic("Nested #HV exception, HV IST corrupted, stack
>                 type = %d\n", info.type);
>   </snip>
> 
> - Thinking about below solution to detect the nested
>   #HV reliably:
> 
>   -- Make reliable IST stack switching for #VC -> #HV -> #VC case
>      (similar to done in __sev_es_ist_enter/__sev_es_ist_exit for NMI
>      IST stack).

I'm not convinced any of that is actually correct; there is a *huge*
window between NMI hitting and calling __sev_es_ist_enter(), idem on the
exit side.

>   -- In addition to this, we can make nested #HV detection (with another
>      exception type) more reliable with refcounting (percpu?).

There is also #DB and the MOVSS shadow.

And no, I don't think any of that is what you'd call 'robust'. This is
what I call a trainwreck :/

And I'm more than willing to say no until the hardware is more sane.

Supervisor Shadow Stack support is in the same boat, that's on hold
until FRED makes things workable.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-06-06  7:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-15 16:59 [RFC PATCH V6 00/14] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler Tianyu Lan
2023-05-16  9:30   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-17  9:01     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-05-30 12:16     ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-05-30 14:35       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-30 15:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2023-05-30 18:52           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-30 19:03             ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-31  9:14             ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-07 18:19               ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-06  6:00             ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-06-06  7:50               ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2023-05-30 15:18       ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 02/14] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path Tianyu Lan
2023-05-16  9:32   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-17  9:55     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-05-17 13:09       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-31 14:50         ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-05-31 15:48           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-31 15:58             ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 03/14] x86/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-05-16  9:40   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-16 15:38     ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 04/14] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception Tianyu Lan
2023-05-16 10:23   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-17 13:28     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 05/14] x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest static key Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 06/14] x86/hyperv: Mark Hyper-V vp assist page unencrypted in SEV-SNP enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 07/14] x86/hyperv: Set Virtual Trust Level in VMBus init message Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 08/14] x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-05-16 10:29   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 09/14] clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: decrypt hyperv tsc page " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 10/14] hv: vmbus: Mask VMBus pages unencrypted for " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 11/14] drivers: hv: Decrypt percpu hvcall input arg page in " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 12/14] x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for " Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 13/14] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest Tianyu Lan
2023-05-16  5:16   ` [EXTERNAL] " Saurabh Singh Sengar
2023-05-17  8:19     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-05-15 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH V6 14/14] x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES Tianyu Lan

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