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From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>, xu xin <cgel.zte@gmail.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>,
	Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>,
	Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>,
	Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Thomas Weißschuh" <thomas@t-8ch.de>,
	"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] procfs: block chmod on /proc/thread-self/comm
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2023 00:09:58 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230713141001.27046-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> (raw)

Due to an oversight in commit 1b3044e39a89 ("procfs: fix pthread
cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE") in switching from REG to NOD,
chmod operations on /proc/thread-self/comm were no longer blocked as
they are on almost all other procfs files.

A very similar situation with /proc/self/environ was used to as a root
exploit a long time ago, but procfs has SB_I_NOEXEC so this is simply a
correctness issue.

Ref: https://lwn.net/Articles/191954/
Ref: 6d76fa58b050 ("Don't allow chmod() on the /proc/<pid>/ files")
Fixes: 1b3044e39a89 ("procfs: fix pthread cross-thread naming if !PR_DUMPABLE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
---
v2: removed nolibc selftests as per review
v1: <https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20230713121907.9693-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 05452c3b9872..7394229816f3 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -3583,7 +3583,8 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 }
 
 static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = {
-		.permission = proc_tid_comm_permission,
+		.setattr	= proc_setattr,
+		.permission	= proc_tid_comm_permission,
 };
 
 /*
-- 
2.41.0


             reply	other threads:[~2023-07-13 14:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-13 14:09 Aleksa Sarai [this message]
2023-07-13 15:21 ` Christian Brauner

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